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General Summary
The neoclassical theory of discrimination is almost entirely a demand-side the­
ory. There are very few contributions where workers’ heterogeneity matters, and 
even fewer that study the possibility that unequal outcomes may arise or persist for 
reasons attributable to workers’ expectations. This dissertation is aimed at filling 
this gap, analyzing the role that workers’ expectations may play in explaining the 
long-run persistence of unequal outcomes that characterize some minorities in the 
labor market.
The first chapter introduces a generalization of the Self-Confirming Equilibrium 
concept to the case of aggregate observable outcomes, i.e. when players at the end 
of each round observe also the outcomes of games in which they are not directly 
involved. Such an extension becomes necessary to characterize the equilibria of a 
game, like that presented in Chapter 2, where social learning is assumed to be more 
important than individual outcomes directly observed by the agents. Moreover, 
aggregate outcomes ensure that Self-Confirming Equilibria do not rely on agents 
accessing different information.
The second chapter presents a model that analyzes the role of minority workers’ 
expectations of being discriminated against. The model is formalized as a two-stage 
game of incomplete information in wThich populations of workers and employers are 
engaged, and where the preferences and beliefs of both sides of the labor market 
matter. In every repetition of the game played by actors randomly drawn from their 
populations, three players participate: one employer and two workers, one of whom 
belongs to a minority group. The employer promotes one (and only one) of the two 
workers after having observed their effort, which is a function of unobservable taste 
for work. Crucially, promotions depend via effort on workers’ expectations about 
the unknown employer’s type, which captures the possible disutility of promoting 
a minority worker. The importance of workers’ expectations can be appreciated
xi
ip)
comparing the equilibrium outcome in terms of promotions arising when minority 
workers overestimate the percentage of discriminatory employers as opposed to a 
situation in which beliefs are correct ceteris paribus. Even in a labor market where 
employers are unbiased and the distribution of ability and taste for work is the same 
across groups of workers, unequal outcomes may still arise due only to workers’ 
expectations. What happens is that wrong beliefs of being discriminated against 
are self-confirming in equilibrium. Minority groups who expect being discriminated 
against supply less effort on average, because of a lower expected return. This 
induces a lower percentage of promotions within minority workers even though 
employers do not discriminate against them either directly or statistically. In turn, 
this outcome is consistent with minority workers’ beliefs that there are employers 
characterized by discriminatory tastes.
The third chapter tests in the laboratory the predictions of the model in Chap­
ter 2. The experiment replicates the model using a game where participants are 
randomly divided into two populations: Reds and Blues. In every trial each par­
ticipant has an endowment of 10 euro cents and can decide how many cents to 
bid to get a prize worth 25 euro cents. Bets are not given back to the players, 
neither to the winner nor to the loser, making the game equivalent to an all-pay 
auction. The prize is awarded to the higher bid and it is split if bids are equal, 
unless the opponents are assigned to a “crazy computer” which instead awards 
the prize to the red player regardless of the bids. The mechanism underlying the 
Self-Confirming equilibrium driven by wrong beliefs is tested repeating the same 
treatment, where the fraction of crazy computers was equal to zero but unknown 
to the players, both before and after they face an increasing and known fraction of 
crazy computers. A reduction of bids made by disadvantaged subjects leading to a 
lower fraction of prizes assigned to them is observed in three out of seven sessions, 
in line with the theoretical predictions, but it vanishes rather quickly during the 
treatment, failing to generate the Self-Confirming Equilibrium driven by wrong
ll«« .■Ml llilll I -------------
beliefs. Stronger evidence supporting this Self-Confirming Equilibrium emerges 
from the strategy method, where, reacting to ad hoc aggregate statistics showing 
a decreasing fraction of prizes won by them, the blue players bid less and less. In 
turn, their lower bids make them less likely to win, confirming in some sense their 
wrong expectations that they were less likely to get the prize.
The fourth chapter tests on the field whether the expectations about the gen­
der wage gap are in line with the realizations. Data collected among second year 
students of Bocconi University convey information about their wage expectations. 
Detailed controls allow a clean matching with a sample of Bocconi graduates pro­
viding information about their actual wages. The evidence shows that the gender 
gap implied by students’ expectations one year after graduation is consistent with 
the gender gap implied by the earnings of their elder counterparts. There is instead 
a misperception of the gender gap later in the career because students expect the 
gender gap to be roughly constant while realizations indicate an increasing gap 
with experience, particularly for the relatively less skilled workers. Interestingly, 
there is also evidence that the realized gender gap at the beginning of a career is 
particularly high in the most recent cohorts and lower in the previous ones. Fi­
nally, our results suggest that the careers of females are characterized by “glass 
ceilings,” in particular at high skill levels, and by “sticky floors” at the opposite 
end of the skill spectrum.
Results suggest that from a theoretical point of view workers’ expectations can 
play an important role in explaining the long-run persistence of observed unequal 
outcomes that characterize some minorities in the labor market. An experiment 
shows that, to some extent, this is also the case in the laboratory, while field data 
provide evidence about how clearly the gender wage gap is perceived by a sample 
of students.
xm
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Extended Summaries
Chapter 1
Summary
This chapter provides an extension of the Self-Confirming (or Conjectural) 
Equilibrium concept to the case of aggregate observable outcomes within an ex­
tensive form game of incomplete information. The motivation for such an exten­
sion is that, in some circumstances such as the theoretical framework presented in 
Chapter 2, social learning is more informative than individual outcomes directly 
observed by the agents. Hence, player would choose to use aggregate observables, 
if available, instead of individual observables to form their beliefs. This happens 
in at least two situations: First, whenever players access at a larger scale the same 
relevant information available a t the individual level; second, when individual ob­
servables are more informative, but each player participates to a sufficiently small 
number of repetitions of the game.
Chapter 2
Abstract
This chapter explores the role of workers’ expectations as an original explana­
tion for the puzzling long-run persistence of observed discrimination against some 
minorities in the labor market. A game of incomplete information is presented, 
showing that groups of workers with the same characteristics may be characterized 
by unequal outcomes in equilibrium due to their different beliefs, even though dis­
criminatory tastes and statistical discrimination by employers have disappeared. 
Wrong beliefs of being discriminated against are self-confirming in this circum­
stance, being the ultimate cause of a lower percentage of promotions which supports 
these wrong beliefs.
xiv
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Summary
This chapter explores the role played by minority workers’ expectations of be­
ing discriminated against as an original explanation for the long-run persistence 
of observed unequal outcomes in the labor market. The main result is that in 
equilibrium groups of workers that have the same innate characteristics may be 
characterized by unequal outcomes. The reason is that minority workers’ wrong 
expectations of being discriminated against become self-confirming. The idea is 
that minority groups who expect being discriminated against supply less effort 
on average, because of a lower expected return. This induces a lower percentage 
of promotions within minority workers even though employers do not discriminate 
against them either directly or statistically. In turn, this outcome is consistent with 
minority workers’ beliefs that there are employers characterized by discriminatory 
tastes.
The model is formalized as a game of incomplete information in which popula­
tions of workers and employers are engaged. In every constituent game, i.e. in every 
repetition of the game played by actors randomly drawn from their populations, 
three players participate: one employer and two workers, one of whom belongs to 
a minority group. The employer promotes one (and only one) of the two workers 
after having observed their output. Crucially for the results of this chapter, pro­
motions depend via effort on workers’ expectations about the unknown employer’s 
type, which captures his possible disutility of promoting a minority worker.
The importance of workers’ expectations can be appreciated by comparing the 
equilibrium outcome in terms of promotions arising when minority workers over­
estimate the percentage of discriminatory employers as opposed to a situation in 
which beliefs are correct ceteris paribus. Even in a labor market where employers 
do not discriminate against minority workers either directly or statistically, and 
where the distribution of ability and taste for work is the same across groups of 
workers, unequal outcomes may still arise due only to workers’ expectations. It is
xv
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worth stressing that such assumptions are made in order to test workers’ expec­
tations as a “stand-alone” source of unequal outcomes from a theoretical point of 
view, not because other sources are regarded as negligible. What happens is that 
wrong beliefs of being discriminated against are self-confirming in equilibrium.
Minority workers do not “test” their beliefs, meaning that they do not verify 
whether the employers would have promoted them had they chosen higher effort. 
The reason is that no single worker has any incentive to experiment, because, as 
when information cascades occur, his observation would have a negligible infor­
mation value. Moreover, the mechanism behind such a self-confirming equilibrium 
is robust both to trial work periods, which are instead an effective policy device 
to break down statistical discrimination outcomes, and to affirmative actions like 
quotas. The conclusion is that, from the theoretical point of view, workers’ expec­
tations may well contribute to explain the puzzling long-run persistency of unequal 
outcomes observed in the labor market.
Chapter 3
Abstract
This chapter is an experimental analysis of the role played by workers} expec­
tations in explaining the puzzling long-run persistence of observed discrimination 
against certain minorities in the labor market The experiment provides some evi­
dence supporting the theoretical prediction that unequal outcomes may emerge due 
to disadvantaged workers ’ wrong expectations o f being discriminated against How­
ever, this effect is not long-lasting, since players learn the true state of nature in 
later stages of the experiment, failing to generate a Self-Confirming Equilibrium 
driven by wrong beliefs. The strategy method provides additional evidence that 
expectations matter.
Summary
XVI
This chapter is aimed at testing the predictions of the model in Chapter 2 and 
in particular that workers’ expectations of being discriminated against may be an 
original explanation for the puzzling long-run persistence of observed discrimina­
tion against some minorities in the labor market.
The experiment replicates the model using a game where participants are ran­
domly divided into two populations: Reds and Blues. In every trial each partici­
pant has an endowment of 10 Euro cents and can decide how many cents to bid 
to get a prize worth 25 Euro cents. Bets are not given back to the players, neither 
to the winner nor to the loser, making the game equivalent to an all-pay auction. 
Therefore, at the end of the trial the winner gets 25 Euro cents plus the amount 
not bet, while the loser gets only the amount not bet. In every lottery there are 
only two participants, one from the red population and one from the blue popula­
tion, The players know that they face only one opponent in every trial and that it 
is possible to face the same opponent more than once during the same treatment, 
but of course they do not know when, given that random assignment takes place 
at the beginning of each trial. The prize is awarded to the higher bid and it is split 
if bids are equal, unless the opponents are assigned to a “crazy computer” which 
instead awards the prize to the red player regardless of the bids.
The mechanism underlying the Self-Confirming equilibrium driven by wrong 
beliefs in the theoretical model is tested by means of an identical treatment, where 
the fraction of crazy computers is equal to zero but unknown to the players, pro­
posed both before and after they face an increasing and known fraction of crazy 
computers. A reduction of bids made by disadvantaged subjects leading to a lower 
fraction of prizes assigned to them is observed in three out of seven sessions, in 
line with the theoretical predictions, but it vanishes rather quickly during the 
treatment, failing to generate the Self-Confirming Equilibrium driven by incor­
rect beliefs. The parallel of this finding in the labor market would be a situation 
in which minority workers, after having been discriminated against, expect that
xvii
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unfavorable conditions continue while biased employers have actually disappeared. 
Hence, minority workers reduce their effort, and accordingly they are promoted less 
frequently, but eventually they discover that biased employers have disappeared 
and balanced promotions across populations of workers are observed.
The main reason why the experiment does not provide strong evidence in favor 
of unequal outcomes driven by subjects’ expectations, is that the experiment fails 
to separate the beliefs of the two populations. In the theoretical model different 
expectations about the fraction of discriminatory employers are a necessary con­
dition for the Self-Confirming Equilibrium driven by wrong beliefs, but in the lab 
Blues never expect a clearly higher fraction of crazy computers than Reds. A pos­
sible explanation for this finding is that the experimental design overemphasizes 
the discontinuity between treatments, preventing carryover effects from emerging. 
Another possible explanation is tha t the set of choices is roughly continuous. This 
induces only a very slight difference in the optimal behavior of advantaged and dis­
advantaged subjects, and therefore also a very low cost of experimenting to discover 
the true state of nature. Finally, it is also worth noting that, from a regression 
where all observable and unobservable individual characteristics are controlled for, 
Blues display a propensity to bid much more than Reds ceteris paribus in spite of 
the random assignment of the color.
The strategy method, on the other hand, supports the Self-Confirming Equi­
librium driven by wrong beliefs. In fact, advantaged and disadvantaged subjects 
react in a different way when ad hoc aggregate statistics are displayed. Subjects 
are asked to bid five times, after five different fictitious distributions of prize win­
ners across populations in the previous period have been displayed. This fictitious 
distribution shows a fraction of prizes awarded to the Blues decreasing from 80% 
to 0% in subsequent trials. Although all subjects are informed that there is no 
computer that awards the prize according to the color label, what happens is that 
blue players are influenced by the aggregate statistics showing that a decreasing
xviii
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fraction of them gets the prize, and thus bid less and less. In turn, their lower bids 
make them less likely to win, leading to unequal outcomes, which are consistent 
with wrong expectations that they were less likely to get the prize.
The experiment also deals with the relevance of the information structure by di­
viding the two populations into two subgroups, one observing individual outcomes 
only (bids and winners of the games in which the player is directly involved), while 
the other is also informed about the distribution of bids within, as well as the 
distribution of promotion across, populations. From the experiment there is no 
evidence of different patterns between these two subgroups.
Concluding, findings of the experiment provide some evidence supporting the 
Self-Confirming Equilibrium driven by wrong beliefs, but the evidence cannot be 
considered fully satisfactory. In order to provide a more robust test of the the­
oretical model, future experiments should be modified to include such things as 
dichotomized alternatives or less clear-cut treatments.
Chapter 4
Abstract
This chapter explores the extent to which the gender wage gap is anticipated by 
workers7 expectations. Data collected among second year students of Bocconi Uni­
versity convey information about their wage expectations. Detailed controls allow 
a clean matching with a sample of Bocconi graduates providing information about 
their actual wages. The evidence shows that the gender gap implied by studentsi 
expectations one year after graduation is consistent with the gender gap implied by 
the earnings of their elder counterparts. There is instead a misperception of the 
gender gap later in the career after graduation because students expect the gender 
gap to be roughly constant while realizations indicate an increasing gap with expe­
rience, particularly for the relatively less skilled workers. There is also evidence 
that the gender gap at the beginning of a career is particularly high in the most
xix
recent cohorts and lower in the previous ones. Finally, our results suggest that the 
careers oj females are characterized by uglass ceilings, ” in particular at high skill 
levels, and by “sticky floors” at the opposite end of the skill spectrum.
Summary
The evidence presented in this chapter points towards some interesting findings. 
We show that the gender gap implied by students’ expectations one year after 
graduation is consistent with the gender gap observed in the actual earnings of their 
older counterparts who have already graduated. There is instead a misperception 
of the gender gap ten years after graduation because students expect the gender 
gap to be roughly constant while realizations point toward an increasing gap with 
tenure. The gender gap diminishes but does not disappear when several controls 
such as family background, place of birth, high school diploma, university program 
attended, performance at university, civil status and number of children are taken 
into account.
A second set of intriguing results concerns the evidence on realized gender gaps 
independently of expectations. Here, in contrast with the recent literature for 
industrialized countries, we see no evidence of a diminishing gender gap between 
subsequent cohorts of Bocconi graduates at the beginning of a career. In particular, 
the gender gap immediately after graduation displays a puzzling upward trend and 
reaches particularly high and significant values in the most recent 1997 cohort. 
This result is likely to be a consequence of the elimination of the cost of living 
adjustment scheme called Scala Mobile which prevailed in Italy during the ’80s 
and was abolished in 1992.
Finally, while the gender wage gap for the best graduates is large already at the 
beginning of a career but remains more or less constant throughout the working 
life, for the worse graduates the gender gap starts slightly lower but increases more 
significantly with experience. These results suggest that the careers of females are
xx
characterized by “glass ceilings,” in particular at high skill levels, and by “sticky 
floors” at the opposite end of the skill spectrum. Unfortunately, our data do not 
allow us to shed more light on the real nature and on the determinants of these 
differences in career developments.
xxi
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Chapter 1
An Extension of the 
Self-Confirming Equilibrium 
Concept to the Case of Aggregate 
Observables
1.1 Introduction
The Conjectural (or Self-Confirming) Equilibrium captures a situation in which 
no player receives any signal which makes her change her beliefs about the type 
and strategy of the opponents. Therefore, players’ beliefs can be wrong, as long 
as players do not receive information inconsistent with their wrong beliefs. In the 
literature the conjectural equilibrium concept is analyzed within a wide range of 
extensive form games of incomplete information. One example is given by infinitely 
repeated games with interactions among players who are always the same at every 
stage of the game and whose type is private information. Another example is given 
by the so-called population games, in which at every stage each player is randomly 
matched with one or more players of the other population(s) whose type is private
3
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information. In the latter example every player could face potentially different 
opponents at every stage. Therefore, her conjecture must concern the distribution 
of types and strategies within the population from which the potentially different 
opponents are chosen, and no longer the type-strategy of some fixed opponents. 
However, a common feature of these specifications is that players are assumed to  
observe (and keep track of) the outcomes of the games in which they are directly 
involved, and not of the aggregate outcomes, i.e. the outcomes of all the constituent 
games played in a given period within the given society.1
This chapter provides an extension of the Self-Confirming (or Conjectural) 
Equilibrium concept, as introduced by Battigalli (1987), Fudenberg and Levine 
(1993 and 1998) and Dekel Fudenberg and Levine (2003), to the case of aggregate 
observable outcomes within an extensive form game of incomplete information.1 2 
Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003) also consider this case, but they assume that the 
whole joint distribution over the set of types and outcomes is observable, whereas 
I assume that only the distribution of terminal histories of the constituent games 
is observable.
The motivation for such an extension is that, in some circumstances, social 
learning is more informative than individual outcomes directly observed by the 
agents. Hence, players would choose to use aggregate observables, if available, 
instead of individual observables to form their beliefs. This happens in at least 
two situations: first, whenever players access at a larger scale the same relevant 
information available at the individual level; second, when individual observables 
are more informative, but each player participates in a sufficiently small number 
of repetitions of the game.
1 “Constituent game,” as defined for example in Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), is used instead 
of the more common “stage game” to identify every repetition of an infinitely repeated supergame. 
The reason is to avoid confusion between one period and one repetition of the game (which can 
be composed of many periods), since stage is used in both senses in the literature.
2 In this chapter the generalization of the Self-Confirming Equilibrium concept is limited to 
to the particular information structure and the setting of the game characterizing the model 
presented in chapter 2.
4
In the first case, suppose that each player observes the history (i.e. the complete 
sequence of actions) of the game in which she is directly involved as well as all 
the statistical distribution of histories arising from all the other games where other 
players are involved. If private information does not convey more information than 
the history of the game, directly observed outcomes have a negligible information 
value with respect to the joint distribution of histories at the aggregate level. 
Therefore, players will form their beliefs using aggregate observables only.
In the second case, suppose that individual outcomes have an additional in­
formation value compared to the aggregate observables, for instance because at 
aggregate level only the marginal distributions of actions across populations are 
known, while players observe the history of the game in which they axe directly 
involved. If agents play infinitely many times, individual outcomes will be more 
informative. However, if each agent participates in a limited number of repetitions 
of the game, aggregate outcomes may still be an (approximately) sufficient satistic 
to form her beliefs.
An example should be helpful to make the point. Chapter 2 describes a model 
that analyzes the role of workers’ expectations of being discriminated against in 
order to explain unequal outcomes that characterize some minorities in the labor 
market. A game of incomplete information with observable actions and private val­
ues is presented, with players representing populations of workers and employers. 
In every constituent game, i.e. in every repetition of the game played by actors 
randomly drawn from their populations, three players participate: two workers, 
one of whom belongs to a minority group, and one employer. The employer pro­
motes one (and only one) of the two workers after having observed their effort, 
which is a function of unobservable taste for work. Promotions depend via ef­
fort on workers’ expectations about the unknown employer’s type, which captures 
his possible disutility of promoting a minority worker. Players try to figure out 
the distribution of types and strategies among the populations of opponents us-
5
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ing available information. In particular, minority workers try to figure out their 
probability of being promoted conditional on observed workers’ output.
Within this framework, a history is a sequence of actions that includes th e  
productivity of workers in the first period, the decision about promotion and th e  
productivity of workers in the second period.
When the sequences of actions arising from all the constituent games are public 
domain, the information directly available from the games in which each player is 
directly involved becomes negligible because the probability of being promoted 
conditional on workers’ output can easily be inferred from aggregate statistics 
(first case above).
Suppose instead that aggregate observables are not as informative as the indi­
vidual observables, for example because only the marginal distributions of actions 
across populations are available. This means that the distributions of effort and 
promotions across populations are known, but in this case the exact combination 
of effort levels upon which each promotion has been decided cannot be retrieved. 
Instead, this information is available at the end of the constituent game in which 
each player is involved (the game is characterized by observable actions). Hence, 
the probability of being promoted conditional on pairs of effort levels is better in­
ferred through individual observables, provided that a sufficiently large number of 
observations is available. If, instead, each player participates in a finite and small 
number of repetitions of the game, as is intuitively the case when considering the 
decision about her promotion that a worker might face during her career, aggre­
gate observables might be relatively more informative (and this will certainly be 
the case at the beginning of her working life).
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1.2 The structure of the game
What follows is a simple extensive form game of incomplete information which 
allows the Self-Confirming (or Conjectural) Equilibrium concept to be extended to 
the case of aggregate observable outcomes.
The model is formalized as an infinitely repeated extensive game of incomplete 
information in which N  populations are engaged. The population game is repeated 
infinitely under random matching at the beginning of each period, meaning that 
at every repetition of the game every player is randomly matched with one player 
from each of the other populations to play the so-called constituent game. I use 
the following assumptions and notation.
• Populations. There are N  populations characterized by a continuum of 
players. Each population i =  1, N  corresponds to a role in the constituent 
game.
• Incom plete inform ation. Every indvidivual player of each population 
knows her own payoff type only.
The number of types is finite and the distribution of types within each popu­
lation is assumed to be fixed. Hence, there is an infinite number of individuals 
for every role i and type 0,, so that assuming that the law of large numbers 
holds, the actual fraction of any given combination of types coincides (almost 
surely) with its probability.
0  =  0 j x 0 2 x ... x B n is the set of type profiles;
0 =  (0i , . . . ,0jv) € 0  is the vector of types characterizing the players in a 
constituent game;
Pi € A(©i) is the statistical distribution of types in population i.
Types are statistically independent across populations. Thus p ~ p \  x ... x 
Pn  € A (0) is the true statistical distribution of type profiles, fixed once and
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for all at the beginning of the repeated interaction.
In every constituent game, the probability of facing a given combination o f 
types of opponents ¿L* € 0 _, coincides with the (fixed) product of the fre­
quencies of each type of opponents within her population, that is —
H j& p M )-
•  H istories, z  € Z  denotes a generic terminal history, i.e. a complete sequence 
of actions, played in a constituent game, a € A(Z) denotes a distribution 
of terminal histories in the population game, obtained pooling the terminal 
histories z arisen in all the constituent games, h € H  denotes non-terminal 
histories.
•  S trategies. Strategies in the constituent game are functions that map non­
terminal histories into feasible actions $ i : H  Ait such that s»(/i) € Ai(h) 
for each h €  H, where Ai(h) is the set of feasible actions for player/role i a t 
history h. Note that players know their type from the very beginning of the 
game, i.e. there is no ear ante stage in which they plan how to play without 
knowing their type. This is the reason why strategies are not defined as 
functions of players’ types.3 S  =  Si x ... x S n  denotes the set of strategy 
profiles. S-i denotes the set of i’s opponents’ strategy profiles.
Each player is assumed to play pure strategies. However, in the constituent 
game every player faces, in every role other than hers, a population of op­
ponents playing pure strategies, which is equivalent to face one opponent 
playing a mixed strategy. The probability associated with each pure strat­
egy in the support of such a mixed strategy coincides with the frequency of 
players playing that pure strategy.
3 On the other hand, if there is an e x  ante stage at which i plans how to play the game before 
she learns her type, it makes sense to define i ’s strategies as functions with domain 0 ,  x H .  
Note that the ex ante and the ex p o s t formulations of the Self-Confirming Equilibrium are not 
necessarily equivalent.
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C : S  —* Z  is the function that in every constituent game maps players’ 
strategies into terminal histories.
• Payoffs. Ui : © x Z  —► R denotes agent z’s payoffs, which depend both on 
the strategies played in the constituent game where she was directly involved 
and on her type. Note that the present formulation allows for interdependent 
values, since agent i ’s payoffs may also depend on opponents’ type.4
Players try to figure out the distribution of types and strategies among the 
populations of opponents using available information. Besides observing the se­
quence of actions z € Z  of the constituent game in which she is involved, every 
player is assumed to observe also a  e A(Z), i.e. the distribution of sequences of 
actions which have occurred in all the constituent games played in a given period. 
In other words, each player observes not only the outcomes of the game in which 
she is directly involved but also the distribution of histories in the population 
game. Players are therefore assumed to access very informative statistics. Individ­
ual outcomes become a useless source of information when compared to available 
aggregate outcomes in order to infer the type-strategy profile of the opponents.
1.3 Definition
The Self-Confirming (or Conjectural) Equilibrium concept, applied to the frame­
work described above, captures a situation in which:
a) each player maximizes her utility given her beliefs about the type-strategy 
profile of the opponents.
b) no player receives any signal that contradicts her beliefs.
For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that individual players have point 
beliefs /r 6 A(© x S) about the actual distribution of types and strategies in *9
4 When payoffs of an agent are not a function of the opponents’ type, the game is characterized 
by private values.
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the population game.5 Assuming that players know that types are independent 
across populations, it makes sense to assume that in a steady state beliefs axe 
represented by product measures: fi =  x ... x jiN, where e A(0 * x S i)  
denotes the marginal of fi on 0* x 5,-. The marginal of fi on 0 —, x is denoted 
/i_i € A(0_j x 5-,*). These beliefs refer to the general case of a game characterized 
by interdependent values. When a game is instead characterized by private values 
and no assumption is made concerning the knowledge of opponents’ rationality, 
the Self-Confirming Equilibrium can be defined using beliefs about strategies only 
\i € A (S). Beliefs about types can be disregarded, unless players believe th a t  
opponents are rational. Knowledge of opponents’ rationality make it necessary 
to define beliefs about types as well, because in this case players are aware th a t  
whether a strategy of an opponent is a best reply or not depends on her type. T he  
model presented in Chapter 2 is characterized by private values, but it implicitly 
assumes that players believe that the opponents are rational. Hence, beliefs will 
be defined also about types.
Players form their beliefs about the type-strategy profile of the opponents using 
aggregate observables. However, both the role of the individual player in the  
constituent game (i.e. the population she belongs to) and her type may affect her 
beliefs. For instance, the dataset used in Chapter 4 provides interesting evidence 
that men and women share very similar expectations about the magnitude of the 
gender wage gap, arguably because they access the same information about its 
realization. However, they assign a different importance to the underlying causes. 
In fact, while a larger fraction of men thinks that “actual differences between men 
and women” matter, a larger fraction of women points towards the “employers’ 
discriminatory tastes” as one of the causes for the expected gap.
In the definition below it is assumed that all individual players of the same type 
6i within each population t, share the same beliefs, denoted ¡i9i € A ( 0 x 5 ) ,  and
0Otherwise, beliefs would have the more general form fi e A[A(0 x 5)],
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play the same strategy, denoted sp € 5*. This assumption can be easily relaxed, 
at the cost of some notational complexity.
Definition 1 A Self-Confirming Equilibrium is a profile of strategies and beliefs 
(s^ ,p6i)i=i...NA€©i such that f or every population i — and every type
&i •
a) The chosen strategy sp is best reply to the marginal belief about the 
opponents ’ type-strategy profile:
$p € argmax ^  C (««»«-<)) •
ii^ —*)€(©—»x i)
b) The observed distribution of outcomes a, obtained from all the constituent 
games, coincides with the subjectively expected distribution obtained from belief 
that is, for every terminal history z  € Z it must be the case that:
T ,  p (0) = *(* ) =  2  /*** ( M  •
... («,.):<(»)=*
It is worth noting that, while beliefs in condition a) refer to opponents only, 
beliefs in condition b) also include the population from which player i is drawn. 
The reason is that every player accesses aggregate observables, i.e. the distribution 
of terminal histories in the whole population game, where also other players from 
the same population as hers are involved. 1
11
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Chapter 2
Discrimination and Workers’ 
Expectations
2.1 Introduction
Despite several contributions to the literature, there is still no widely shared expla­
nation for the long-run persistence of discrimination in the labor markets. More­
over, the neoclassical theory of discrimination is mostly a demand-side theory. 
There are very few contributions where workers’ heterogeneity matters, and, to the 
best of my knowledge, only a recent paper by Breen and Garcia-Penalosa (2002) 
studies the possibility that unequal outcomes may persist for reasons attributable 
to workers’ expectations.
The goal of this chapter is to analyze the role of workers’ expectations, so 
far neglected in the literature, in explaining the observed unequal outcomes that 
characterize some minorities in the labor market. The idea is that minority groups 
who expect being discriminated against supply less effort on average, because of 
a lower expected return. This induces a lower percentage of promotions within 
minority workers even though employers do not discriminate against them either 
directly or statistically. In turn, this outcome is consistent with minority workers’
15
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beliefs that there are employers characterized by discriminatory tastes.
The model is formalized as a  game of incomplete information in which popula­
tions of workers and employers are engaged. In every constituent game, i.e. in every 
repetition of the game played by actors randomly drawn from their populations, 
three players participate: one employer and two workers, one of whom belongs to  
a minority group. The employer promotes one (and only one) of the two workers 
after having observed, their effort. Crucially for the results of this chapter, pro­
motions depend via effort on workers’ expectations about the unknown employer’s 
type, which captures his possible disutility of promoting a minority worker.
The importance of workers’ expectations can be appreciated by comparing the 
equilibrium outcome in terms of promotions arising when minority workers over­
estimate the percentage of discriminatory employers as opposed to a situation in 
which beliefs are correct ceteris paribus. Even in a labor market where employers 
do not discriminate against minority workers either directly or statistically, and 
where the distribution of ability and taste for work is the same across groups of 
workers, unequal outcomes may still arise due only to workers’ expectations. It is 
worth stressing that such assumptions are made in order to test workers’ expec­
tations as a “stand-alone” source of unequal outcomes from a theoretical point of 
view, not because other sources axe regarded as negligible. What happens is that 
wrong beliefs of being discriminated against are self-confirming in equilibrium.
Minority workers do not “test” their beliefs, meaning that they do not verify 
whether the employers would have promoted them had they chosen higher effort, 
because no single worker has any incentive to experiment. Moreover, the main 
result, i.e. that unequal outcomes may be ascribable to workers’ different expec­
tations, is robust both to trial work periods, which are instead an effective policy 
device to break down statistical discrimination outcomes, and to a not too strong 
degree of affirmative actions like quotas. The conclusion is that workers’ expecta­
tions may well contribute to explain the puzzling long-run persistency of unequal
16
outcomes observed in the labor market.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. After some definitions are outlined 
in Section 2.1.1, the constituent game of the model, i.e. the game after the players 
have already been matched, is presented in Section 2.2.1. The population game, the 
matching process and the information structure, necessary to characterize beliefs, 
are described in Section 2.2.2. Section 2.3 concentrates on the analysis of the 
equilibria of the model and its policy implications. The connections of the model 
to the related literature are sketched in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.1.1 Definitions
In the literature many different and occasionally contradicting definitions have 
been used referring to discrimination in the labor market. Discrimination has been 
defined either as different achievements (wages, promotions) for equally productive 
workers, or as different achievements for workers that have the same charateristics 
ex ante, i.e. for workers with the same ability and taste for work. Not infrequently, 
the two concepts have been used interchangeably, but this seems inappropriate, 
because ex ante equal workers can be characterized by different productivity in 
equilibrium.
A good compromise, partially following Blau, Ferber and Winkler (2002), is to 
use two different definitions. On the one hand, following the “equal pay for equal 
work” principle, direct discrim ination can be defined as a different treatment 
in terms of wages, promotions, or job allocations for equally productive workers.1 
On the other hand, a more comprehensive definition seems to be necessary, too. 
The reason is that it would be hard to consider as discriminatory an employer 
who pays or promotes minority workers less (on average) if they are (on average) 
proportionally less productive. Nevertheless, it would be misleading to disregard 
the fact that many factors, and direct discrimination can be one of the most im­
1 Often the definition of direct discrimination refers to “equally qualified” workers.
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port ant, may affect workers’ behavior. If minority workers are less productive, fo r 
example, because they have changed their behavior reacting to a worse job assign­
ment, the different achievements should not be viewed as equal treatment, even if  
there is no evidence of direct discrimination. Such a situation is captured by th e  
more comprehensive concept of cum ulative discrim ination, defined as different 
achievements for workers that have the same characteristics ex ante.
Another distinction that deserves to be mentioned is that between group and  
individual discrimination. The former happens when different achievements are  
observed on average either between groups of workers that are on average equally 
productive (direct group discrimination) or between groups of workers which are 
ex ante equal (cumulative group discrimination). The latter happens when an  
individual is judged on the basis of group membership rather than upon his or 
her own characteristics only. Individual discrimination is a characteristic of all the 
models of incomplete information and concerns both the majority and the minority 
group. Moreover, it does not imply group discrimination. Henceforth, even though 
not specified, discrimination always refers to group discrimination.
2.2 The model
The model is formalized as a two-stage game of incomplete information in which 
populations of workers and employers are engaged. The two populations of workers 
differ because of an observable characteristic (race, gender, etc.) which does not 
affect their effort (productivity) e. The observable characteristic distinguishes the 
so-called majority worker, identified by subscript A, from the so-called minority 
worker, identified by subscript B. Employers are denoted by subscript F. Workers 
compete in order to be promoted. Promotions depend on both employers’ and 
workers’ type as well as on their beliefs about the opponents’ type-strategy profile. 
Crucially for the results of this chapter, promotions depend via effort on work-
18
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ers’ expectations about the unknown employer’s type, which captures his possible 
disutility of promoting a minority worker.
The following section focuses on the constituent game, i.e. on what happens 
after the players have been drawn from their populations and matched. The pop­
ulation game, the matching process and the information structure, necessary to 
characterize beliefs, are described in Section 2.2.2.
2.2 .1  T h e  constituent gam e
In every constituent game one employer and two workers, one of whom is a “mi­
nority” worker, are drawn from their populations and play a two-stage game. 
In the first period both workers choose one out of three possible levels of effort 
eA’eB € E — {¿,t, h } , where l stands for “low”, i stands for “intermediate” and 
h stands for “high.” The employer observes workers’ effort in the first period and 
promotes one (and only one) of the two workers. After having observed the em­
ployer’s decision, workers choose a level of effort eA, e |  € E  in the second period.
The constituent game is characterized by observable actions, because workers’ 
effort as well as the decision about promotion are directly observed. The game is 
also characterized by incomplete information, because every player knows his or 
her type only.
Incomplete information
In this game every player knows his\her own type only.
6a € ©a and 0B 6 Ob summarize the type of majority and minority workers, 
respectively. Workers’ type represents their taste for work, formalized as a weight 
attached to the disutility of effort in the second period (see equations (2.1) and (2.2) 
below). There are only two possible types of worker 0 A =  Ob ~  {1,K } ,K  > 1. 
The higher the parameter, the higher the cost of effort.2
2 Taste for work is assumed to matter in the second period only, as if one of the two types of
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Bp € 0 ^ represents employer’s tastes for discrimination, i.e. the disutility of 
promoting a minority worker. For the sake of simplicity, the types of employer 
axe restricted to Bp =  {0,d} , with d sufficiently large. If Op =  0 the employer is 
indifferent about the observable characteristic, which distinguishes the workers. On 
the other hand, if 0p = d the employer suffers a disutility when the minority worker 
is promoted. The disutility d is assumed to be sufficiently high that promoting 
worker A is always the optimal choice regardless of workers’ effort.
Summarizing, a minority worker knows her own taste for work while the 
type 9a of the majority worker and the tastes for discrimination Op of the employer 
are unknown.3
Payoffs
The structure of the utility function is the same for majority (A) and minority (B) 
workers and it is parametrized according to their type 6. The analysis focuses on 
risk neutral workers, whose lifetime utility is
u°* = wA -  (e\)2 +  w \ -  I(a A) ^ ( e 2A\aA)2 -  I (a B)9A(e2A\aB)2, (2.1)
U*B = (eg) 2 + w % - I(a A)9B(e%]aA)2 -  I{aB) ^ ( e 2B\aB)2, (2.2)
where:
worker (9  — K )  became lazier after the promotion decision. Allowing different tastes for work in 
the first period would de fa c to  resolve the employer’s uncertainty about workers’ type before the 
decision about promotion is taken. Such an uncertainty is instead necessary to get the results 
that are shown in section 2.3. To get the same results even relaxing this assumption it would 
be necessary to remove the restriction that ability is equal for all workers. A more plausible 
model would be obtained providing the same insights at the price of a substantially increased 
complication (see also footnote 5). It is worth noting that assuming that the type differs in the 
second period only does not imply that the first period is negligible. Although the istantaneous 
utility fuction is the same for all workers in the first period, the choice of effort depends on the 
utility during the whole working life. In particular, workers characterized by a lower cost of effort 
in the second period have a stronger incentive to ©cert a higher effort also in the first period, in 
order to increase their probability of being promoted.
3 Of course, the same holds m u ta tis  m u tand is for players B  and F,
2 0
JWp is the wage in period t for the worker belonging to population P  =  (A, B); 
ép is effort in period t for the worker belonging to population P  =  [A, B)\ 
a a means that worker A  is promoted, aB that worker B  is promoted;
/(•) is the indicator function that assigns the value 1 when the argument is 
true, for instance when the worker A  is promoted I {oca ) — 1» / ( c*b ) =  0;
< 1 summarizes that the job assigned to the promoted worker is more 
desirable, because for any given level of effort the disutility will be lower.
A ssum ption 1. vA =  é .  The labor market is assumed to be competitive, 
therefore productivity is entirely paid to workers.4 Moreover, productivity co­
incides with effort. This assumption makes the game equivalent to the reduced 
form of a more general game where workers’ output is observed and verifiable and 
employers compete on enforceable piece-rate contracts. Workers would be free to 
move, but in equilibrium wl = é  and nobody moves. A similar argument can be 
used to justify inside promotions in equilibrium.5
It follows from the utility function in (2.1) and (2.2) that in the second period 
effort will be higher if the worker is promoted
e > A  =  § -a >  4 *| (aB) =  ± - t
4 > B  = ^  > 4*1 ( * a ) =
Substituting the type of workers 0A,0B G {1, K ]  into these equations, it becomes 
evident that a bad type who is promoted supplies the same effort as a good type 
who is not promoted.6
4 In this model, productivity stands for output per worker. It does not refer to a worker’s 
innate characteristic. Therefore, a more productive worker is simply a worker characterized by a 
higher output.
°This assumption implies that ability does not matter in this model. A more general version 
in which ability varies across workers but is identically distributed within populations have been 
solved using numerical simulations, and it turns out to be much more complicated without being 
more insightful (see also footnote 2).
6 The specification of the utility function adopted in the paper is the same as that proposed by
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A ssum ption 2: The set of levels of effort is E  =  =  =
Both in the first and in the second period there are only three conceivable levels 
of effort h > i > l > 0 that stand for “high,” “intermediate” and “low.” They 
coincide with the optimal choice in the second period of a good type who is no t 
promoted, of a bad type who is promoted as well as of a good type who is not 
promoted, and of a bad type who is not promoted, respectively.
As fax as the employer is concerned, the utility function contains both profits 
and a  parameter summarizing the disutility associated with the promotion of work­
ers B. This means that only workers B  face the risk of being discriminated against, 
because of the observable characteristic that, without affecting their productivity, 
differentiates them from workers A. Since productivity is assumed to be entirely 
paid to workers, in this model discrimination can only assume the form of denying 
a promotion to a worker B that would deserve it. Employer’s utility function is
USr= { m -  l ) ( e \  + e1B + e \ + e |)  -  a B0F,
where m  > 1 is a known and constant mark-up on workers’ productivity due to 
the entrepreneurial activity. Therefore, in order to maximize profits, the employer 
needs to maximize workers’ productivity. In other words, the employer has an 
incentive to promote the more productive worker.* 7 The term cxb@f represents the 
disutility associated with the promotion of a minority worker. When Op ~  0 the 
observable characteristic that distinguishes the workers does not matter and profits 
are the only thing that the employer considers. On the other hand, when 0F = d 
the employer is characterized by discriminatory tastes.
the asymmetric tournament literature (see O’Keeffe, Viscusi, and Zeckhauser (1984)). The only
difference is that here the role of the prize is played by the lower cost of effort attached to the
job assigned to the promoted worker.
7It is also possible to interpret F  as a supervisor rather than an employer. Instead of profits, 
the supervisor maximizes a bonus which is a fraction of the overall productivity of the workers. 
Nothing would change in practice, because also the supervisor has the incentive to promote the 
more productive worker in order to maximize his\her bonus.
2 2
Strategies
Workers move twice, the second time after the decision about promotion has been 
taken by the employer, choosing effort simultaneously. The strategy s of a worker 
is therefore a triple containing an effort level for the first period, and two effort 
levels for the second period, one if promoted, another if not promoted. For both 
populations of workers effort can take the same three values only: e1, e2 € {h, z, /}.
The employer observes each worker’s effort in the first period and then promotes 
one (and only one) of them to a more rewarding position. The set of feasible 
actions for the employer, regardless of her type, is simply {a a , <x b} , where a a 
stands for “promotes worker A" and a B stands for “promotes worker As fax 
as the employer is concerned, strategies $p axe therefore a vector that specifies a 
promotion decision for every possible pair of observed effort levels. Employers of 
type 6jr = 0 axe not affected by the observable characteristic that distinguishes 
workers A from workers ¿3, and therefore they do not suffer a disutility promoting 
a minority worker. Hence, they will always promote the worker they think will be 
more productive after the promotion, regardless of the population she comes from. 
If workers are of different type, the employer maximizes her utility promoting the 
worker characterized by higher tastes for work (i.e. lower 0). Moreover, in order to 
prevent unequal outcomes from arising because of asymmetric choices of employers 
who are instead supposed to be indifferent to workers’ membership, the following 
assumption is necessary.
A ssum ption 3: Strategies of non-discriminatory employers implement a fair 
contest In other words, strategies of non-discriminatory employers are invariant 
to the permutation of the observable characteristics that distinguishes workers 
ceteris paribus, meaning that promotions depend on productivity only (see Lazear 
and Rosen, 1981).
To complete the description of the constituent game, players’ beliefs also need 
to be specified. Before defining players’ beliefs, however, it is necessary to describe
23
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how players are matched and what information they can access.
2 ,2 .2  T he p opu lation  gam e
The constituent game described in section 2.2.1 is inserted in a supergame, called 
population game, which specifies how players are matched and what information 
they can access. This supergame is not formally described in what follows. T h e  
reason is that the equilibria of the constituent game that will be presented in sec­
tion 2.3 can be thought as rest points of a learning process, and therefore they a re  
analyzed in a stationary framework. Since the main role of the population game 
is simply to provide a dynamic framework that justifies such equilibria, the de­
scription will focus only on the information structure that allows to define players’ 
beliefs.
There are three populations, one of employers and two of workers. As already 
said for the constituent game, the two populations of workers differ because of an  
observable characteristic (gender, race, etc.) that does not affect their productivity. 
The distribution of types within the two populations of workers is identical. This 
assumption rules out the possibility that unbalanced promotions across populations 
arise because of a different average disutility of work. a
Matching
Each of the three populations P  =  {A, B, F} is composed of a continuum of players, 
so that the law of large numbers can be assumed to ensure that the actual fraction 
of any given combination of types of A, B  and F  players coincides (almost surely) 
with its probability. The three populations play an infinitely repeated game. At 
every stage each player of population A  is randomly matched with one player from 
population B  and one player from population F.
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Inform ation struc tu re
Players try to figure out the distribution of types and strategies among the popula­
tions of opponents using the available information. Besides observing the terminal 
history, i.e. the complete sequence of actions, z — {e\, e^, a, e \, eB) £ Z  of the 
constituent game in which she is involved, every player also observes the distribu­
tion of terminal histories a £ A (Z )t i.e. the distribution of complete sequences 
of actions that has occurred in all the constituent games. Players are therefore 
assumed to access very informative statistics: individual outcomes are a useless 
source of information when compared to available aggregate outcomes. The avail­
ability of aggregate outcomes under observable actions rules out the possibility that 
unequal outcomes arise in equilibrium, like in Breen and Garcia-Penalosa (2002), 
as an inheritance of past differences in fundamentals.
Beliefs
Beliefs of a player are a probability measure over the unknown component of the 
type-strategy set 0 x 5  — 0 ^ x 0 B x ©f  x Sa x Sb x Sf . Given that every player 
is supposed to know her own type and the strategy she chooses only, the unknown 
component of © x S  is the set of type-strategy profiles of all the other players, both 
the opponents and the other players of her own population. Beliefs of a worker of 
population A  when her type is 0 are defined as
p?A£ A (O x 5 ).
A ssum ption 4: Beliefs exclude the possibility that opponents correlate their
play:
sAßß> sB,6Fi sF)= ß6A{0A, sA)ßB*(6B, sB)peA(ôF,s F).
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Since every player knows her own type and strategy, the appropriate marginal 
distribution for worker A is
V0a (&b , sB,6Fi sf )= y?A{6B, sB)f¿eA(8F,s F).
i
Something more needs to be said about employers’ beliefs. Before decid­
ing, the employers update their beliefs observing workers’ effort. Employers’ 
prior beliefs are a probability measure over each worker’s type-strategy profile 
(6a , sa),V'Gf{@b , sb) . Such beliefs can be revised independently using Bayes 
rule, given that the productivity of worker A  does not convey information about 
worker B  and vice versa. Defining
/ F(eJt)= 53  { eA,sA:e\=e\}
{Qai3a)€(&axSa)
the (strictly positive) probability that an employer of type 6 assigns to the effort 
level ¿a € E  according to his\her prior beliefs, updated beliefs after the observation 
of e\ will be:
P9f(9a >Sji |ê i)=
f*9FVA,SA)
/Me’}»)
0
if &A,SA : eA ~  
i f 9A, sA - e \ ^
Although this model does not deal with dynamics, I think it is useful to pro­
vide an intuition about how beliefs may be formed in this game. Beliefs of a 
player at time t can be thought to  be a function of the available information about 
aggregate outcomes arising from the previous period Notice that the same 
sequence of observables can lead to different beliefs. In other words, players can 
interpret in different ways the same information about aggregate outcomes. For 
example, workers can interpret a given distribution of promotions across popula­
tions A  and B  assigning different weights to the role played by workers’ effort and
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employers’ propensity to discriminate against the minority. Of course, asymptotic 
empiricism requires that in equilibrium all the belief rules must generate subjective 
distributions of observables which coincide with the objective one.
For instance, the dataset used in Chapter 4 provides interesting evidence that 
men and women share very similar expectations about the magnitude of the gender 
wage gap, arguably because they access the same information about its realization. 
However, they assign a different importance to the underlying causes. In fact, while 
a larger fraction of men think that “actual differences between men and women” 
matter, a larger fraction of women points towards the “employers’ discriminatory 
tastes” as one of the causes for the expected gap.
A ssum ption  5: Workers believe that employers’ strategies are weakly mono­
tone in productivity:
Vek, > l*(aA\i,elB) > i i ( a A\l,e\,)
VeÀ, ¡i(aB\e\,h) > n(aB\e\,i) > f i ( o B|e^;)
Workers think that the probability of being promoted cannot decrease when effort 
increases ceteris paribus. This assumption is a way of refining the set of equilibria. 
The intuitive reason is that promotions are desirable, and workers may be willing 
to give up utility in the first period in order to enhance their probability of being 
promoted. The way to do this is to deviate from effort i in the first period, where 
i is the optimal choice in a world without promotions, supplying either l or h. 
Assumption 5 means that one’s willingness of being promoted can be signaled only 
through a higher effort. All the equilibria that could possibly arise when workers 
signal their willingness of being promoted supplying l are excluded. Moreover, 
exerting effort l in the first period becomes strictly dominated for all workers.
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2.3 Analysis of the equilibria
In this section two qualitatively different sets of equilibria are presented. The first 
set (see Proposition 2) displays symmetric outcomes under the assumption that th e  
expectations of all players are correct. The second set of equilibria (see Proposition 
3) shows that unequal outcomes may arise when minority workers’ expectations 
are wrong ceteris paribus.
Two different concepts axe necessary to analyze the equilibria of the model: 
the Self-Confirming Equilibrium (henceforth: SCE) as generalized in Chapter 1 to  
cover the case of aggregate observables, and the Bayes-Nash Equilibrium (hence­
forth: BNE). The two concepts share the feature that each player maximizes utility 
given her beliefs, updated whenever possible, about every possible opponents’ type- 
strategy profile (see section 2.3.1). The difference between them is that in a BNE 
each player has a correct conjecture about the relationship between opponents’ 
types and choices, i.e. about their behavioral rules. In the commonly applied sub­
case when beliefs satisfy the Common Prior assumption, beliefs about opponents’ 
types are correct as well. On the other hand, when the Common Prior assumption 
is not satisfied, beliefs may be contradicted by the evidence and the BNE could 
not be justified as a  rest point of a learining process. On the contrary, in an SCE 
beliefs may not coincide with the true distribution of opponents’ type-strategies 
profile, as long as they are not contradicted by the evidence (see Battigalli and 
Guaitoli (1997) and Dekel, Fudenberg and Levine (2003) for a formal discussion of 
the relation between the Common Prior assumption, BNE and SCE in games of 
incomplete information). '
The equilibria in both Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 axe Perfect Bayes-Nash 
(henceforth: PBNE) and Self-Confirming at the same time. This is fairly intuitive 
in Proposition 2 given that the Common Prior assumption is satisfied and therefore 
beliefs are correct. Nevertheless, this is the case also in Proposition 3 even though 
the Common Prior is violated. In fact, neither beliefs of worker A  nor beliefs
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of worker B, although different, are contradicted by the evidence. Furthermore, 
beliefs of both workers correctly predict players’ behavioral rules (see section 2.3.2).
2.3 .1  U tility  m axim ization  given beliefs
a) Employers
Only workers’ difference in productivity after the promotion affects the em­
ployer’s decision, while the difference in the first period does not. The reason 
is that the disutility Op is associated with the promotion of a minority worker. 
Therefore, at the margin only benefits from the promotion of a minority worker 
(i.e. difference in productivity after promotion) are compared with the associated 
cost Bp in order to decide which worker is optimal to promote.
Employers of type Bp =  0 are not affected by the observable characteristic 
that distinguishes workers A  from workers B, and therefore they do not suffer 
a disutility promoting a minority worker. Hence, they will always promote the 
worker they think will be more productive after the promotion, regardless of the 
population she comes from. If workers are of the same type the overall productivity 
and the employer’s utility after the promotion are the same regardless of the worker 
who is promoted. On the other hand, if workers’ type is different the employer 
maximizes her utility promoting the worker characterized by higher tastes for work 
(i.e. lower 0).
Defining /¿0iP(e^|e\) as the updated beliefs of a non-discriminatory employer 
about the effort of worker A in the second period having observed e \  in the first, 
the best reply BR°F (e1) to the observed pair of productivity levels e1 =  (e^, e^) 
will depend on the comparison of workers’ expected productivity in the second 
period. Formally:
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(2.3)
a A = BR°F (e1) if
£  /*°'(4l4)4 > £  A  (414) 4.e\€E e%€E
which means that promoting a  majority worker is the best reply whenever th e  
majority worker is expected to  be strictly more productive in the second period, 
given the observed productivity levels. Similarly, promoting a minority worker 
is the best reply whenever equation 2.3 holds with reversed inequality sign. If  
expected productivity in the second period is the same, the non-discriminatory 
employer is indifferent.8 This means that both a  a and as  as well as all the 
mixed strategies would be best replies. However, the only non-trivial strategy that 
satisfies 2.3, that implements a fair tournament (assumption 3) and that satisfies 
monotonicity (assumption 5) is:
i , i  —► 0.5; h ,z —► 1 ; i ,h  —► 0; h ,h —* 0.5, (2.4)
where the action is defined as “percentage of workers A promoted” and, for ex­
ample, “h ,i” means that the productivity levels of worker A  and worker B  in the 
first period are high and intermediate, respectively.9
Employers of type = d are characterized by tastes for discrimination and, 
since by assumption d is sufficiently large, they promote worker A  regardless of
8 When non-discriminatory employers only are involved, the game becomes equivalent to an 
all-pay auction, insofar as the utility loss suffered by a non-promoted worker who chose effort h  
instead of i is sunk; see Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1996).
9 Pairs of productivity levels where effort l is involved are not considered because in the first 
period l is strictly dominated for both workers under assumption 5.
All the employer’s strategies that do not contain h , i  —* 1 ; i, h  —► 0 are weakly dominated.
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any observed and expected productivity level of the two workers:
=  B & H e 'W e 1.
b) Workers
Workers’ optimal actions in the second period according to their type and 
the employer’s decision have already been derived when describing assumption 2. 
Substituting such values in the utility functions (2.1) and (2.2) we obtain:
U  =  e 1 -  (e1)2 +  I ( a A) j  +  I ( a B ) j  for $A =  1,
U  =  e* -  (e1)* + / ( o u ) j + /(<**) j  for 9B =  1,
U  =  e, - ( e , )* +  / ( a A) i  +  / ( e B) ^  for 6 a  =  K ,
U  =  e l -  (e1)2 +  I ( a A) ±  +  I ( a B)±  for 6B =  K .
As far as the first period is concerned, it can be shown that all the strategies 
containing / are stricly dominated for all workers as long as they believe that 
employers’ strategies are monotone (assumption 5). The utility of a type Ba =  1 
choosing i and h in the first period is, respectively:
u(i)  =  ^  +  // (<*aN) j  +  (i -  ^  M O )
U(k) =  j - ~  +  p (« ii | f t ) J  +  (l-Ai(aA|ft))J.
where //(o^| i) and fi (<^a W  are the subjective probabilities of being promoted 
when playing i and A, respectively.10 Therefore, type $a — 1 will choose h in the 10
10In the superscript identifiyng the type and population of the player is omitted in
order to avoid a heavy notation.
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first period if U(h) — U(i) > 0, which leads to
p ( < * A \ h ) ~  t i ( a A \i) > { K -  1 ) .
Similarly,
•  a  worker 0B =  1 will choose h if y, (q b |^) -  A* (c*b \i) > ( #  — 1);
• a worker 0A =  K  will choose h if ~  (p (a^|h) — /a (cu|f)) >  (-K” — 1);
•  a worker $B =  K  will choose h if ^  (/j, (aslh) — // (ctB|i)) > (K  -  1) .
Note that when there is no chance of being promoted, the left-hand side of 
these equations vanishes and h can never be an optimal choice since K  > 1.
2 ,3 .2  Correctness o f  beliefs
Beliefs axe correct whenever, for all the players of every type 9 of each population, 
the subjective probability distribution over opponents’ type-strategy set coincides 
with the objective distribution* For instance,
(Ob , s b ,Of , sp) =  Pr (9 b , s b , Of , s f )  (2.5)
intuitively means that the probability assigned by players of type 9 of population 
A  to every combination of opponents’ type-strategy profile is correct.
Beliefs are not contradicted by the evidence whenever the observed distribution 
of outcomes <7, obtained from all the constituent games, coincides with the subjec­
tively expected distribution. The latter is obtained summing up the probabilities 
attached to every combination of opponents’ type-strategy profiles that would lead 
to a combination of observables equal to <r. It may happen that incorrect beliefs, 
i.e. beliefs which violate (2.5) for some type 0 or strategy s, are not contradicted
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by the evidence.11
2 .3 .3  Existence o f  the equilibria
This section focuses on the role of workers’ expectations. Appropriate assump­
tions axe imposed in order to neutralize all the other potential causes of unequal 
outcomes. In particular:
A ssum ption 6: Only minority workers’ beliefs about employers’ type may be 
wrong, while all the other beliefs are correct In particular,
a) ptF(-) = pla(') =  Pr(-) beliefs of both employers and workers A are correct;
b) ilb{Ba , sa) =  Pr(^»^i4); I^ b (Bb ,sb ) = Pr(0B, sb ) beliefs of workers B  con­
cerning the type-strategy profile both of workers A  and of the other workers B  are 
correct;
c) m b ( s f |#f )  =  Pr(sFl^F) beliefs of workers B  about employers’ behavioral 
rules are correct.
A ssum ption 7: All workers B  share the same beliefs about employers’ type. 
This assumption is crucial for unequal outcomes to be produced by workers’ ex­
pectations within this extremely simplified version of the model. In fact, a small 
fraction of minority workers with correct beliefs would be enough to falsify the 
wrong beliefs of the other workers of that population. This would be a serious 
problem if the goal of the model was to claim that workers’ wrong expectations 
of being discriminated against are the only explanation for observed unequal out­
comes. On the contrary, less ambitiously as well as much more realistically, the 
model is simply aimed at stressing that workers’ expectations can play a relevant 
role. Such a goal is pursued in a way that isolates the role of workers’ expectations 
as much as possible. Not surprisingly, equilibria are not robust to some perturba-
11 The intermediate case, when beliefs are correct only as far as the behavioral rules are con­
cerned, can be represented in the following w'ay:
P6a (sb, 6p) — Pr(sB) $f\&Bi 8f)
P9A(eBieF)^ F i  (eBieF).
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tions like that implied by the relaxation of assumption 7, unless some additional 
degrees of freedom are allowed. This can be done by, for instance, allowing beliefs 
of workers B  about some type-strategy profiles to  differ as well, i.e. relaxing as­
sumption 6b as well, or allowing more heterogeneity of fundamentals within the  
model.
Some of the assumptions made so fax are very convenient from the theoretical 
point of view, because they allow to neutralize other causes of unequal outcomes. 
For instance, the assumption that the distribution of types is the same across 
populations of workers excludes any role of the human capital approach, while 
assumption 6a rules out statistical discrimination outcomes.12 It deserves to be 
stressed once more that such assumptions are made with the only purpose to focus 
on the role of workers’ expectations and not because the other causes of unequal 
outcomes are regarded as less important.
Considering the assumptions made so fax, only one possible difference between 
workers A  and workers B  survives in the model: their expectations about employ­
ers’ type. In particular, beliefs of workers B  about employers’ type may be correct 
fiB(0p) =  Pr(6p) or wrong ¡xB{0F) ^  Pr(0/r), where Pr (£?ƒ*) is the distribution of 
types within the population of employers. Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 contrast 
what happens in these two different situations, everything else being equal.
P roposition  2 When expectations of workers B about employers} type are correct, 
a Perfect Bayes-Nash Equilibrium always exists where:
1) in the first period both types of population A choose the same actions of the 
corresponding type of population B .
2) the percentage of workers A  promoted is equal to 1 — 0.5 Pr ($F — 0).
Sketch of proof
12 The effect of discriminatory tastes has not been neutralized because it is straightforward to 
see what happens with or without imposing Pr (9F =  0) =  1 in Propostions 2 and 3.
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When, in addition to assumption 6, also expectations of workers B  about em­
ployers’ type are correct, /x(a|*) can be substituted with Pr(a|-) for all players, and 
the conditions that make h the optimal choice in the first period become:
Pr(aA|h) -  P r(aA|i) > K  -  1 for 9 a  =  1 (2.6)
i ( P r M A )  -  P rM * ))  >  -  1 for 9a  =  K (2.7)
Pr (aB|h) -  P r (aB|i) > K  — 1 for $b — 1 (2.8)
j~  (Pr (aB|h) -  P r (aB|i)) > K -  1 for 6b = K. (2.9)
Comparing the left-hand side of these equations and using assumption 5 (mono­
tonicity of employer’s strategies), it follows that
(Pr(a|h) — Pr(a|i)) < Pr(a|h) — Pr(a|i).K
In other words, there cannot be an equilibrium in which a worker with a higher 
cost of effort is more productive than a worker with a low cost of effort.
Let us try equation (2.4) as a candidate equilibrium strategy for the non- 
discriminatory employers. Equation (2.4) establishes that the employer promotes 
the worker displaying the higher productivity in the first period, while a coin is 
tossed when productivity is the same. Proposition 2 considers a situation in which 
both types of population A choose the same action of the corresponding type of 
population B. There are three possible situations: a) all the workers choose hy b) 
all the workers choose t, c) e\=K =  i and e]=1 =  h. Given that the distribution of 
types within populations is the same and that employer’s beliefs about the distri­
bution of workers’ type are correct, in a) and b) the employer would be certainly 
indifferent. In c) an employer facing 2, i or h, h is indifferent, while if h, i or i, h are 
observed, it is optimal to promote the worker who supplied the higher productivity, 
i.e. the “good” type. Hence the strategy is actually a best reply.
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If there are non-discriminatory employers only, the equilibrium strategy (2.4) 
implies that for all workers ;
Pr(o|A) -  Pr(a|*) =  0.5.
On the other hand, if there axe also discriminatory employers;
Pr(a|A) -  Pr(a|t) =  0.5 P r {0F =  0). (2.10)
Note that the incentive to supply h is the same for both populations even when 
there are discriminatory employers. This is intuitive, because the assumption tha t 
discriminatory employers always promote A  makes the incentive to exert effort 
h proportional to the percentage of non-discriminatory employers. In the limit 
situation where there are only discriminatory employers, promotion stops being 
an incentive device for both populations, because the As are sure to be promoted, 
while Bs have no chance. This parallels the finding within unfair tournaments that 
both agents exert the same level of effort in equilibrium.
Substituting the equation (2.10) into equations (2.6)-(2.9) above, the conditions 
that make h the optimal choice can be rewritten
0.5 P r {Op =  0) > K  — 1 for workers 0 ^  Ob — 1»
-~:0.5 P r {Op =  0) > K  — 1 for workers 0^, 0b =  K.
The presence of a strictly positive fraction of non-discriminatory employers is 
necessary for promotions to  work as an incentive device. According to the pa­
rameter K  different combinations of effort are observed in the first period, all 
representing a PBNE with the characteristics 1) and 2) of proposition 2 and con­
sistent with the candidate equilibrium strategy for the employer proposed in (2.4). 
Regardless of the value of AT, the fraction of workers A  who are promoted is always
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1 — 0.5 Pr (Op = 0) and when Pr (Op =  0) =  1, i.e. when discriminatory tastes 
disappear, promotions are balanced across populations.
mm
In the second period, and in both populations, “good” workers who are pro­
moted supply hy “bad” workers who are promoted as well as “good” workers who 
are not promoted supply i, while “bad”workers who are not promoted supply Z.
The PBNE described in Proposition 2 are not unique. For instance, there 
are other PBNE associated with strategies of the employers different from (2.4). 
Outcomes of these equilibria can differ from those characterized above. However, 
these other PBNE share the feature that, for every equilibrium with more than 
1 — 0.5 Pr (Op =  0) workers A promoted, there exists another equilibrium in which 
more than 0.5 Pr (Op = 0) workers B  are promoted.13
What changes if pB(0p) = Pr(0/?) no longer holds and in particular when 
workers B  overestimate the percentage of discriminatory employers? Beliefs about 
opponents’ behavioral rules are still correct for all players by assumption. Hence, 
the equilibria that arise are still PBNE. Assuming that pB(0p) ^  Pr(0^) while 
assumption 6a still holds means that beliefs do not satisfy the Common Prior 
assumption anymore. As already mentioned, in this case beliefs about opponents’ 
type may be not only incorrect but also contradicted by the evidence. However, 
Proposition 3 refers only to PBNE that are also SCE, i.e. when beliefs are not 
contradicted by the evidence.
P roposition  3 I f  a Self-Confirming and Perfect Bayes-Nash Equilibrium exists 
when minority workers overestimate the percentage of discriminatory employers, 
i.e. when p B (Op = d)>  Pi (Of — d), it must be characterized by 
1 )  all workers A supplying h and all workers B supplying i 
2) only workers A being promoted.
^Characteristics of equilibria different from those proposed in Proposition 2 have been analyzed 
by means of simulations.
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Sketch of p roof
For such an equilibrium to exist, conditions for the incentive of workers A  to  
supply h do not change with respect to (2.6) and (2.7). As fax as workers B  axe 
concerned, instead, conditions (2.8) and (2.9) become:
pP (q b |/i) -  pP (c*b K) > K  — 1 for 9 =  1, (2.11)
^ { y ,B {aB\ h ) - t i B {aB\i)) > K -  1 for 9 =  K. (2.12)
The same strategy as in (2.4) for non-discriminatory employers, together w ith 
the assumption that discriminatory employers promote only workers A, implies 
that the gain in the probability of being promoted playing h instead of i is
Pr(a^|/i) — Pr(au |0  =  O.5Pr(0F =  0), (2.13)
pP{ctB\h) -  pB(oLB\i) =  O.S//5 (0f  =  0), (2-14)
for workers A  and B, respectively.
Combining (2.8), (2.9), (2.11), (2.12), (2.13) and (2.14) the conditions that 
make h the optimal choice can be rewritten:
0.5P r (9f =  0) >  K -  1 for0A =  l,
-^O.5Pr(0F =  O) >  K -  1 fo r6A =  K,
0.5/xfl (eF = 0) > K  -  1 for eB =  1,
-^0.5//® (6f =  0) >  K -  1 for eB = K.
K
It can be shown by combining properly the inequalities above that the first part 
of the proposition is equivalent to impose that the condition
1 +  0.5pB {9f =  0) < K  < 1 +  y j 1 *f- 2 Pr ($F —- 0) 2 (2.15)
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holds.14 Substituting for /iB (Op =  0) > Pr (Op — 0), i.e. imposing that minor­
ity workers do not overestimate the fraction of discriminatory employer, violates 
(2.15). Hence, the fact that workers B  overestimate the percentage of discrimina­
tory employers is a necessary condition for these inequalities to hold.15
Since all the workers of population A supply h and all the workers of population 
B supply z, the employers’ strategy (2.4) implies that only workers A  are promoted 
(second part of the proposition). Such a strategy is in turn a best reply for the 
employers and it can be shown it is the only strategy that is not weakly dominated 
under assumptions 3 and 5. The second part of the proposition amounts to verify 
that, when yp (Op =  d) > Pr (0F = d ) , wrong beliefs axe always falsified unless the 
employer’s strategy contain both “promote worker A  when e \ = h,elB — z” and 
“promote worker B  when e \  =  z, elB =  h.”
Em piricism
Workers A and employers have correct beliefs about other players’ type-strategy 
profiles. Hence, the objective distribution of observables coincides with the sub­
jective distributions implied by their beliefs.
Wrong beliefs of workers B  concern the employers’ type only. Assumption 
6b implies that their expected distributions of productivity (and therefore wages) 
within populations in the first period axe correct. Associated with the observed 
outcome, “worker A exerts h - worker B exerts z,” their correct beliefs about 
employers’ strategies are associated with no worker B  promoted even though their 
beliefs about employers’ type axe wrong. Finally, also the expected distribution of 
wages within populations in the second period is correct.
U niqueness of unequal outcom es when f.iB (Op =  d) > Pr (Op =  d)
14For instance, with K  =  1.2, the inequalities are satisfied if at the same time y r  (Op — 0) < 0.4 
and Pr (Op =  0) > 0.5.
15 The result that effort differs across otherwise identical workers because of their different 
beliefs, may also be interpreted as a formal justification for the existence of uneven touraments 
between ex a n te  equal workers.
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Observe first that uniqueness refers to the vector of observables (effort levels 
and promotions) and not to the array of strategies and beliefs that characterizes 
an equilibrium. In other words, there can be many observationally equivalent equi­
libria, i.e. many arrays of strategies and beliefs that generate the same vector o f 
observables. Moreover, the importance of the uniqueness of such equilibria does 
not go beyond the goal of addressing a possible question of the reader, who could 
otherwise reasonably wonder whether there are other equilibria and what charac­
teristics they have. Needless to say, uniqueness relies upon all the assumptions 
that have been made, not merely upon y B {Op — 0) < P r(0p =  0).
In order to show the uniqueness of the vector of observables described in Propo­
sition 3, the first step is to  delete all the combinations of productivity levels asso­
ciated with the combination of strategies that have no chance of being chosen.16 
Among the various combinations of productivity levels that can be observed, it 
can be shown that e \  = h ,e lB = i is the only one compatible with an employ­
ers’ best response that does not falsify minority workers’ wrong beliefs. Another 
necessary condition for the wrong beliefs not to be contradicted is that also the 
non-discriminatory employers promote worker A  after observing e \ — h,elB ~ i.
The hypotheses behind Propositions 2 and 3 differ only because of the ex­
pectations of workers B. In Proposition 2 their expectations are correct, while in 
Proposition 3 workers B  are assumed to overestimate the percentage of discrimina­
tory employers. Results differ considerably, with wrong expectations of being dis­
criminated against leading to unequal outcomes with only workers A  promoted.17
16 For instance, given assumption 5, it cannot happen that a “bad” type of worker exerts a 
strictly higher effort than a “good” type of the same population in the first period. Furthermore, 
ftB {$p  = 0 ) < Pr ( 8 f  — 0) implies that for a worker B  it cannot be optimal to supply a strictly 
higher effort than the corresponding type of worker A, given that they share the same beliefs 
about employers’ strategies (assumption 7).
17Observing only workers A promoted is certainly a knife-edge result. This is due to the strong 
assumptions made throughout the chapter. Having more than two types of workers, for instance, 
makes it possible to observe equilibria in which the fraction of workers A  promoted is greater 
than that of the corresponding PBNE with Common Prior, but lower than one.
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Furthermore, nothing changes from the theoretical point of view when it is as­
sumed that there axe no discriminatory employers, i.e. Pr (8F =  d) =  0, meaning 
that workers’ expectations can be a “stand alone” source of unequal outcomes.
Minority workers do not “test” their beliefs, meaning that they do not verify 
whether the employers would have promoted them had they chosen higher effort. 
The reason is that no single worker has any incentive to experiment, because his 
observation would have a  negligible information value. Only if a sufficiently large 
fraction of minority workers experiments with exerting high effort can the initial 
beliefs be contradicted, but this cannot happen because of a “free-riding” problem.
Comparing results in Proposition 2 with what happens in Proposition 3, it 
turns out that workers B  are worse off while workers A  are better off, because of 
the change in the probability of being promoted that become more favorable for the 
latter. Also employers are worse off. Being proportional to workers’ productivity, 
profits are lower in the first period given that workers B  supply i rather than h 
while profits do not change in the second period.
2 .3 .4  P olicy  im plications
Trial work periods can be an effective policy tool to break down statistical discrimi­
nation outcomes, i.e. a situation where employers’ wrong beliefs are self-confirming. 
On the contrary, the equilibria described in Proposition 3 are robust to trial work 
periods, for the simple reason that trial work periods affect employers’ expecta­
tions rather than workers’ expectations. As long as minority workers think they 
are discriminated against, during the trial work period they will display a lower 
productivity. At the end of the first period of the game, which can be regarded as a 
long trial work period, employers observe workers A supplying a higher output and 
promote them even though there is no bias, either statistical or driven by tastes, 
against the minority.
Quotas can also be implemented to correct unequal outcomes. Although they
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effectively increase the number of minority workers promoted, they do so w ith­
out affecting the mechanism that generates unequal outcomes in the equilibria o f 
Proposition 3. The simplest way to implement quotas is to say that at least a  
percentage q > 0 of minority workers must be promoted, with q known by all play­
ers. In this model, given that only one worker from each population participates 
in every constituent game, such a result can be obtained by imposing a lottery o n  
the employers. The outcomes of this lottery are that with probability q employers 
are forced to promote the minority worker, while with probability 1 — q they are 
free to choose according to their preferences and updated beliefs. Paradoxically, 
after the introduction of quotas workers B  are less likely to exert effort h in th e  
first period. In fact, conditions for h being an optimal choice become:18
(i -  ?)o.5/xb (eF  = o) 
(1 -  (eF  = 0)
> (K  — 1) t<x0B = l,
> ( K -  1) for 9b =  K.
The same happens for workers A:
(1 — 9)0.5 Pr ($p =  0)
( l - 5)-io.5Pr(eJ, = 0)
> (K  — 1) for 0J4 =  1,
> ( K -  1) for 9a =  K.
If for workers A it is still optimal to supply h, nothing changes with respect to 
Proposition 3, except that now all players correctly expect that q minority workers 
will be promoted. For minority workers to realize that they are overestimating 
the percentage of discriminatory employers, the only way is to impose a q “big 
enough” to make (one or both types of) workers A  choose i instead of h. At that 
point, the number of minority workers who are promoted will be strictly greater 
than 9, thus contradicting their beliefs.19 It is worth noting that the price for
18Notice that the LHS is negatively correlated with q.
19 It is problematic to provide a sensible translation of “big enough,” since this threshold
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such a result, when achievable, is that both majority workers and employers are 
strictly worse off with the introduction of quotas, which probably makes it rather 
difficult to implement. A similar trade-off between equity and efficiency associated 
with affirmative action programs can also be found within uneven tournaments. 
Experimental evidence, however, does not provide support for such a trade-off.20
Dealing with feedback effects models, Cain (1986) raises a concern which also 
applies to this model and, more generally, to all the models displaying multiple 
equilibria some of which are suboptimal:
“a model’s predicted consequences from a favorable shock axe so 
obviously beneficial to the group discriminated against and to employ­
ers that is difficult to see why the upward spiral would not quickly be 
initiated by group intervention.”
This argument suggests that it should not be difficult to break down unequal 
outcomes based on workers’ expectations, and this is certainly true as far as the 
mathematics of the model is concerned. Many devices can perform this task, like a 
subsidy to minority workers who exert effort h, or a free insurance that pays back 
the money equivalent of the utility loss suffered by minority workers who supplied 
a high effort without being promoted, and so on. However, these devices do not 
seem to have an intuitive counterpart on the field. The bottom line is that, in 
line with Coate and Loury (1993), the best way to correct unequal outcomes is 
to modify the expectations of minorities.21 Policy tools which do not change the 
expectations of minorities are either ineffective or very difficult to implement.
depends on many factors and therefore it varies considerably. For instance, in a situation where 
Pr(0p = 0) =  1 (absence of discriminatory tastes) and K  =  1.2, i.e. around the middle of the 
range that makes it optimal for both types of worker A  to exert h , even imposing balanced 
promotions, i.e. q =  0.5, is not enough to break down the mechanism behind unequal outcomes 
based on workers’ expectations.
20 See Schotter and Weigelt (1992) and Corns and Schotter (1999).
21 For instance, Gay Pride can also be thought of as a device that reduces the sexual minorities’ 
expectations of being discriminated against in the labor market.
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2.4 Related literature
The model presented so far is flexible enough to capture, under appropriate as­
sumptions, the main features of most of the contributions to the discrimination 
literature. In particular, the model can straightforwardly be contrasted with the 
other contributions in the literature by specifying what are the assumptions that 
make them directly comparable. One thing that must be taken into account is 
that, although these contributions often focus on wages rather than promotions, 
the main stylized facts can be replicated focussing on promotions as well.22
Six groups of models are presented: discriminatory tastes, statistical discrim­
ination, human capital theory, feedback effects, workers’ expectations and asym­
metric tournaments.
2 .4 .1  D iscrim in atory  tastes
The starting point of the economic analysis of discrimination in labor markets can 
be found in the article “The Economics of Discrimination” by Becker (1957). In 
Becker’s model, the existence of direct discrimination between workers of differ­
ent groups, which are perfect substitutes in the production function, is based on 
the discriminatory preferences of employers, co-workers or customers. Hence, dis­
crimination is caused by fundamentals (discriminatory tastes), while beliefs do not 
play any role because there is no uncertainty. Within this framework, members 
of the discriminated group must receive a lower wage in order to be accepted as 
employees, co-workers or salespeople.
22In this section, theories have been selected and outlined in such a way as to facilitate con­
trast and comparison with the model of workers’ expectations. Therefore, the choice of the 
contributions is far from being exhaustive, focussing only on the theoretical aspects of some 
competitive neoclassical models and institutional theories. Also the relative weights assigned to 
various aspects of such theories reflect primarily the necessity of the comparison with the workers’ 
expectations model, rather than some sort of consensus about what has been considered more 
important in the literature thus far. Another reason for this choice is that many detailed surveys 
are already available (see Blau, Ferber and Winkler (2002) and Cain (1986) among others).
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The following are the assumptions that must be imposed on the model presented 
in Section 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, in order to make it equivalent to the discriminatory tastes 
approach.
1. The employer’s type set is a singleton 0 F =  {d} , with d > 0.
2. Beliefs assign probability one to the true type-strategy profile of the oppo­
nents (absence of uncertainty). In other words, expectations do not matter.
While in Becker’s model discrimination takes the form of different pay for equal 
work, in the game obtained imposing these assumptions discrimination takes the 
form of always promoting worker A.
Among the advantages of Becker’s approach, there is the possibility of explain­
ing the rise of any type of direct discrimination (based on sex, race, religion, etc.). 
On the other hand, the major problem lies in its long-run implications: if markets 
are competitive and there is heterogeneity of discriminatory tastes, only the less 
discriminatory employers (or the non-discriminatory ones if present) should sur­
vive. The reason is that discrimination is costly for the employer, so that when 
competition drives profits toward zero discriminatory employers will suffer a nega­
tive utility. Alternatively, we should observe complete segregation. However, both 
predictions are contradicted by empirical evidence.
2 .4 .2  Statistical discrim ination
In the statistical discrimination models, group membership is assumed to convey 
information regarding individual characteristics, about which incomplete infor­
mation is assumed. Several models have been developed within this strand of 
literature, using different devices in order to explain the long-run persistence of 
observed discrimination. Common to these models is the fact that, unlike Becker’s 
one, fundamentals are not relevant.
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The seminal contribution in the statistical discrimination literature has been 
proposed by Arrow (1973).23 Employer’s beliefs about the existence of different 
characteristics between (ex ante identical) groups turn  out to be correct in equi­
librium.24 Why are these expectations confirmed in equilibrium? In other words, 
why are these wrong beliefs self-confirming? The mechanism is the following: a 
worker’s a priori unobservable variable (e.g. effort) is endogenously affected by 
employer’s beliefs (e.g. via lower wages, or via worse job assignments), leading 
to a suboptimal investment in her skills (or a suboptimal supply of effort) and 
therefore determining an outcome that confirms the beliefs of the employer. The 
conclusion is that in equilibrium there is cumulative but not direct discrimination, 
because workers are ex ante equal but show a different productivity in equilibrium.
Statistical discrimination outcomes, as modeled by Arrow, can be replicated 
within the game of section 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, provided that appropriate changes 
are made to the structure of the constituent game.25 Such changes axe necessary 
because in Arrow’s model the employer plays using prior beliefs, contrarily to 
the game presented above. Promotions have to be modified into job assignment 
decisions for the two models to be equivalent. Hence, the whole first period has to 
be cancelled and appropriate assumptions have to be made accordingly.
1. Employers’ strategies coincide now with feasible actions with a a standing 
for “assign worker A  to the good job and worker B  to the bad job” and vice 
versa for a s -26 Workers’ strategies contain two effort levels, one if assigned
23 Other examples of statistical discrimination can be found in Phelps (1972), who concentrates 
on the effect of an imperfect predictor of the true productivity of a worker, and Spence (1973), in 
his pioneering work about signaling. A skeptical reading of the statistical discrimination approach 
can be found in Aigner and Cain (1977) and Cain (1986). Some of the arguments raised by Cain 
are also relevant in the model of workers’ expectation presented in this paper and have been 
addressed in section 2.3.4.
24Moro and Norman (2002) analyze statistical discrimination using a general equilibrium 
approach.
2oOne could certainly argue that, strictly speaking, Arrow’s model cannot be nested in the 
model of section 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, given that it is necessary to define a different game,
26The good and the bad job coincide with the job assigned in section 2.2.1 to the promoted
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to the good job and another if assigned to the bad job. Therefore, workers’ 
payoffs become:
U°A =  wA - I { a A) ^ ( e A\aAf  -  I (a B)BA(eA\aB)2,
U°B =  ioB — I(oiA)9B(eB\aA)2 — H qb ) -^ (^ b \<^b )2-
2. Discriminatory tastes do not play any role, i.e. the set of employer’s types 
is a singleton ©F =  {0} . The employer’s action is observed, and this implies 
that workers’ expectations do not matter any more, because when they move 
their uncertainty has already been resolved.27
3. Employers believe that minority workers are on average less productive in 
the good job. Defining as pF (eA\aA) the employer’s beliefs about effort of 
worker A  if assigned to the good job, statistical discrimination means that 
the average productivity if assigned to the good job is thought to be lower 
for workers of population B
^ 2  pF (eA\aA)eA >  pF (eB\aB)eB.
Employers expect minority workers to be less productive, and therefore assign 
them to the bad job. Worse job assignment causes minority workers to exert a  lower 
effort, with the result that ex post they are actually less productive, confirming 
employer’s expectations.
Statistical discrimination models have been criticized by Cain (1986), on the 
ground that ‘These models face the criticism that the employer’s uncertainty about 
the productivity of workers may be inexpensively reduced by observing the work­
and to the non-promoted worker, respectively.
27 Fryer (2002) presents a dynamic model of statistical discrimination where workers’ beliefs 
matter but are assumed to be correct.
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ers’ on-the-job performance.” Workers1 performance can be observed, for example, 
by means of trial work periods. Cain’s argument can straightforwardly be encom­
passed into the model presented in this chapter going back to the original version 
of the constituent game, where updated beliefs are used to decide on promotions 
and where the whole first period can be thought as a trial work period. Nonethe­
less, the statistical discrimination model plus trial work period leaves some open 
questions: what determines workers’ behavior in the trial work period? Is it con­
venient for them to increase effort to be assigned to  the good job? The answers 
to these questions cannot be found within the statistical discrimination literature, 
because it is necessary to analyze also the supply side of the labor market. In sec­
tion 2.3, where the role of workers’ expectations is analyzed, it emerges that trial 
work periods axe not an effective policy device to break down unequal outcomes, 
as long as minority workers believe they are discriminated against.
2 .4 .3  T he hum an capital th eo ry
Another strand of the literature, started by Mincer and Polacheck (1974), is the 
so-called human capital theory which analyzes the effects of voluntary choices of 
investment in human capital from a gender perspective. According to this theory, 
women decide to invest less than men in human capital, because they expect a lower 
lifetime return due to a shorter and more discontinuous presence in the labor force. 
As a consequence, they receive less on-the-job training and/or axe assigned to less 
rewarding jobs. Such behavior can be ascribed to the traditional division of work 
within the family (Becker, 1985). In this way, wage differentials, worse career path, 
and/or sex segregation are explained by voluntary choices. If this is the case, the 
different achievements could not be classified as discrimination, given that workers 
are neither equally productive in equilibrium nor ex ante equal.
The human capital theory can easily be nested into this model assuming that:
1. Pr (6a — 1) > Pr (&b =  1) • Having a higher average disutility of effort, mi-
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nority workers find it optimal to supply on average a lower effort. Hence, 
they are less productive.
Some economists have heavily criticized this approach (see the next subsec­
tion), because this seemingly “voluntary” decision could actually be induced by 
discrimination, entering the definition of cumulative discrimination.
2 .4 .4  Feedback effects
The boundaries of this approach are particularly uncertain,28 and usually surveys 
concerning discrimination in the labor market use these models as a counterpart for 
other theories, without analyzing them separately. The reason is that the contri­
butions that can be grouped into this category are quite heterogeneous. The main 
idea they have in common is that the behavior of the workers can in turn be deter­
mined by discrimination. However, the mechanisms through which the behavior is 
affected vary considerably. In many cases there is also a lack of formalization and 
these effects are little more than qualitative statements.
Blau and Jusenius (1976), reverse the causality link with respect to Mincer 
and Polacheck (1974): women, because of experiences of sex discrimination, e.g. 
lower wages, respond with career interruptions and specialization in household 
production, i.e. investing less in human capital.
No specific assumption is necessary to nest this approach into the game of 
section 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, because the presence of workers’ expectation is per se a 
way of formalizing such feedback effects.
28 A large number of the so called “institutional” contributions may also fall into this category. 
Cain (1986) includes also the above-mentioned model by Arrow (1973) within this goup. The 
seminal “institutional” contribution has been made by Myrdal (1944), who theorizes the “princi­
ple of cumulation,” a mechanism of dynamic causation between several variables. These variables 
move together influencing each other once the system is hit by an external shock. Among the 
secondary causes of discrimination, the behavior of workers is also taken explicitly into account: 
“The Negro worker often feels that his fate depends less on his individual efforts than on what 
white people believe about Negroes in general” (Myrdal, 1944). Other contributions follow along 
the line of the vicious circle described by Myrdal, like Ferber and Lowry (1976).
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2 .4 .5  W orkers’ expectations
As already mentioned, the neoclassical theory of discrimination is mostly a demand- 
side theory. But why should workers’ expectations not be allowed to play a role 
as important as that of either employers’ preference in the discriminatory tastes 
approach or employer’s beliefs in the statistical discrimination models?
To the best of my knowledge, the only paper in the literature on discrimi­
nation that focuses on the supply side of the labor market is that of Breen and 
Garcia-Penalosa (2002), who explain the observed persistence of gender segrega­
tion using a Bayesian learning approach. Workers, due to imperfect information, 
do not know and try to learn how much the probability of success in various oc­
cupations is affected by effort or by predetermined individual characteristics (such 
as gender). The “prior” of a man (woman) is the belief received by his father 
(her mother), while the posterior is the belief updated according to his (her) ex­
perience and transmitted to his son (her daughter). Different preferences between 
men and women at some point in the past caused different learning paths and 
different beliefs. This is a sufficient condition to observe lasting unequal outcomes 
in equilibrium for the two groups, even once preferences become equal, meaning 
that past circumstances continue to exert an influence and that expectations can 
be self-fulfilling.
Similarities of this chapter with the work of Breen and Garcia-Penalosa are 
evident: both consider the effect of heterogeneity within the supply side of the labor 
market and both explain the persistence of unequal outcomes using self-confirming 
workers’ expectations. Besides a dynamic setting that prevents it from being nested 
within the framework of Section 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, what differs in the model of 
Breen and Garcia-Penalosa is a  different information structure. Agents learn from 
their parents only, and not from observable aggregate outcomes. Moreover, only 
agents choosing a “high” profile of education and effort are able to learn from their 
experience and transmit updated beliefs to their children, while for the “low” profile
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the learning process stops. The key mechanism behind the results of these authors, 
is that the information structure of the model prevents agents from learning that 
differences in fundamentals have disappeared. In other words, beliefs are still a 
function of differences in workers’ fundamentals. Section 2.3 showed that when 
such an assumption is relaxed within a static framework, workers’ expectations 
can still explain observed unequal outcomes.
2 .4 .6  A sy m m etric  tournam ents
As already mentioned, a tournament is symmetric when outcomes are invariant 
to the permutation of the contestants. On the other hand, asymmetric contests 
are defined “uneven” when agents are different, and “unfair” when contestants are 
identical but the rules favor one of them. The literature on tournaments, started 
by Lazear and Rosen (1981), is not directly related to discrimination. Neverthe­
less, asymmetric tournaments, as described by O’Keeffe, Viscusi, and Zeckhauser 
(1984), provide a useful framework for the analysis of the effects of discrimination 
on promotions. Therefore, asymmetric tournaments are a natural and valuable 
benchmark for the game presented in this chapter. Not surprisingly, the two mod­
els provide similar predicitons in some cases, e.g. that discriminatory tastes, as an 
example of unfair rules, affect the incentives of both worker A  and B  in the same 
way.
Within the literature on uneven tournaments, it is incidentally mentioned that 
unequal outcomes may arise between groups of workers that are ex ante equal.29 
However, the underlying mechanism has not been formalized and, more specifically, 
no role is explicitly played by expectations. Another difference with respect to this 
model is that effort is continuous and imperfectly observable.
29See Schotter and Weigelt (1992).
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2.5 Conclusions
The goal of this chapter is to set up a model that analyzes the role of workes’ 
expectations in explaining the unequal outcomes that characterize some minorities 
in the labor market. A framework is obtained where most of the contributions to 
the discrimination literature can be nested, and therefore directly compared.
The idea is that unequal outcomes may arise due to workers’ expectations. In 
this situation what happens is that wrong beliefs of being discriminated against 
are self-confirming. Minority groups who expect being discriminated against sup­
ply less effort on average, because of a lower expected return. This induces a 
lower percentage of promotions within minority workers, even though employers 
do not discriminate against them either directly or statistically. Nevertheless, un­
balanced promotions axe consistent with their beliefs that there are employers with 
discriminatory tastes. This mechanism implies that workers’ expectations of be­
ing discriminated against are important in reducing the effectiveness of promotion 
as an incentive device and they can contribute to explain the puzzling long-run 
persistence of cumulative discrimination.
A game of incomplete information is presented, showing that ex ante identi­
cal groups of workers may be characterized by unequal outcomes in equilibrium 
because of their different beliefs. The importance of workers’ expectations can be 
appreciated by comparing the distribution of promotions that arises when minority 
workers overestimate the percentage of discriminatory employers with a situation in 
which such beliefs are correct ceteris paribus. With the purpose of testing workers’ 
expectations as a “stand alone” mechanism, the comparison is made by imposing 
appropriate assumptions that rule out other possible sources of unequal outcomes.
Minority workers do not “test” their beliefs, meaning that they do not verify 
whether the employers would have promoted them had they chosen higher effort. 
The reason is that no single worker has any incentive to experiment, because his ob­
servation would have a negligible information value. Moreover, trial work periods,
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which can break down statistical discrimination outcomes, are not an effective pol­
icy tool as long as workers have expectations of employers’ discriminatory tastes. 
Furthermore, wrong beliefs of minority workers are unlikely to be modified by the 
introduction of quotas. The game suggests that the best way to get rid of un­
equal outcomes driven by workers’ expectations is by using beliefs themselves as a 
target. The next step, presented in Chapter 3, is a laboratory experiment which 
can provide empirical evidence about the importance of workers’ expectations as 
a source of unequal outcomes.
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Chapter 3
Discrimination and Workers’ 
Expectations: Experimental 
Evidence
3.1 Introduction
The goal of this chapter is to provide experimental evidence concerning the role 
of workers’ expectations as an explanation for the puzzling long-run persistence 
of observed discrimination against certain minorities in the labor market. The 
model used as a benchmark (see Chapter 2) shows that ex ante identical groups 
of workers may be characterized by unequal outcomes in equilibrium due to their 
different beliefs. In particular, the model shows that unequal outcomes may arise 
when minority workers wrongly believe that they are discriminated against, even 
when employers do not do so either directly or statistically.
The setting of the experiment is not a carbon copy of the model. First, the 
experiment is designed in a way that does not remind subjects that it deals with 
discrimination in the labor market. This is to keep their attitudes, experiences, 
and opinions on the matter out of the lab, preserving the importance of payoffs in
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driving their behavior. The participants are randomly assigned to two populations: 
red and blue. In every lottery there are only two participants, one from each 
population. In every trial every participant has an endowment of 10 Euro cents 
and bids in order to win a prize worth 25 Euro cents. The players know that 
they face only one opponent in every trial. They also know that the higher bid 
wins the prize, unless they face a “crazy computer” that awards the prize to the 
Red regardless of the bids. Bids are not given back to either the winner or the 
loser. Colors (red and blue) are the equivalent of gender (or race, etc.), the prize 
stands for the promotion and the “crazy computers” play the role of discriminatory 
employers. Finally, the amount bet plays the role of effort. In the model, workers 
can choose to give up some utility in the first period exerting an inefficiently high 
level of effort in order to increase the probability of being promoted. Similarly, 
in the experiment subjects can trade (part of) their endowment with a higher 
probability of winning the prize.
This chapter analyzes whether common past experience works as a coordinating 
force. In other words, starting from a situation where there are discriminatory 
employers, do minority workers still expect being discriminated against when they 
do not know that discriminatory tastes have disappeared? A positive answer to 
this question would provide evidence in favor of the model in Chapter 2, and 
in particular that historical factors are crucial in selecting one among different 
possible outcomes (path dependent equilibrium selection), pointing toward the 
existence of hysteresis. This would provide useful insights concerning the long-run 
persistence of discrimination in the labor market.
In the lab, a reduction of bids made by disadvantaged subjects leading to a 
lower fraction of prizes awarded to them, is observed in three out of seven sessions, 
in line with the theoretical predictions, but it vanishes rather quickly during the 
treatment, failing to generate a Self-Confirming Equilibrium (henceforth: SCE)
6 0
driven by wrong beliefs.1 The parallel of this finding in the labor market would 
be a situation in which minority workers, after having been discriminated against, 
expect that unfavorable conditions continue while biased employers have actually 
disappeared. Hence, minority workers reduce their effort, and accordingly they are 
promoted less frequently, but eventually they discover that biased employers have 
disappeared and balanced promotions across populations of workers are observed.
The strategy method, on the other hand, supports the SCE driven by wrong 
beliefs.* 2 In fact, advantaged and disadvantaged subjects react in a different way 
when ad hoc aggregate statistics are displayed. Subjects are asked to bid five times, 
after five different fictitious distributions of prize winners across populations in the 
previous period have been displayed. This fictitious distribution shows a fraction 
of prizes awarded to the Blues decreasing from 80% to 0% in subsequent trials. 
Although all subjects are informed that there is no computer that awards the prize 
according to the color label, what happens is that blue players are influenced by 
the aggregate statistics showing that a decreasing fraction of them gets the prize, 
and thus bid less and less. In turn, their lower bids make them less likely to win, 
leading to unequal outcomes, which are consistent with wrong expectations that 
they were less likely to get the prize.
The structure of the chapter is the following. Section 3.2 describes the the­
oretical framework behind the experiment and summarizes the testable implica­
tions. Section 3.3 displays the design of the experiment as well as its procedure. 
Section 3.4 contains the results. Section 3.5 outlines the contributions to the liter­
ature that are related to this experiment, and Section 3.6 draws some conclusions.
^ h is  chapter follows Davis and Holt (1993) and Roth (1994) using the following terms: 
experim en t: the collection of all data;
session: the collection of data involving the same group of subjects on the same day; 
treatm ent: a unique configuration of parameters, variables and rules; 
trial: a decision unit, one repetition of the game.
2 The strategy method, developed by Selten (1967) is a procedure that asks a group of subjects 
to design their strategies after having repeatedly played a game.
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3.2 Theoretical framework
This chapter aims to provide experimental evidence concerning some testable im­
plications derived from the model that analyzes the role of workers’ expectations in 
explaining observed unequal outcomes in the labor market (see Chapter 2). This 
section provides a summary of the model, emphasizing its testable implications. 
After the experiment is presented in section 3.3, several features are contrasted 
and compared in more detail with the corresponding parts of the model.
The model is formalized as a two-stage game of incomplete information in which 
populations of workers and employers are involved. In every constituent game, i.e. 
in every repetition of the game played by agents randomly drawn from their pop­
ulations, one employer and two workers, one of whom is a minority worker, are 
randomly matched. The workers choose among three levels of effort (low, inter­
mediate, high) and the employer promotes one and only one of the two workers 
after having observed their effort, which is a function of observable effort and un­
observable taste for work. The promotion is desirable because the job assigned to 
the promoted worker is assumed to be characterized by a lower cost of effort. Cru­
cially, promotions depend via effort on workers’ expectations about the unknown 
employer’s type, which captures his possible disutility of promoting a minority 
worker.3 Workers know that there are two types of employer, but they do not 
know whether the employer they face is discriminatory or not. Also the distri­
bution of types within the population of employers is unknown and workers have 
beliefs about that.
The importance of workers’ expectations can be appreciated by comparing the 
equilibrium outcome in terms of promotions that may arise when minority workers 
overestimate the percentage of employers characterized by tastes for discrimina­
3 Observable effort and incomplete information axe the main features that distinguish this ap­
proach from the tournament literature started by Lazear and Rosen (1981). The two approaches 
share most of their predictions, one of which being that discrimination, when it is common 
knowledge, affects the two populations of workers in the same way (see also Section 3.3).
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tion with a situation in which their beliefs are correct ceteris paribus. Assuming, 
for the sake of simplicity, that employers do not discriminate against minorities 
either directly or statistically, and that all the other sources of heterogeneity such 
as the distribution of ability among workers have been neutralized, unequal out­
comes may still arise due to minority workers’ wrong expectations. In other words, 
wrong beliefs about being discriminated against may be self-confirming. In this 
circumstance what happens is that in equilibrium minority groups, who expect be­
ing discriminated against, exert less effort on average, because of a lower expected 
return. This induces a lower percentage of promotions within minority workers, 
which in turn is consistent with their beliefs that employers are characterized by 
discriminatory tastes. On the other hand, when beliefs are correct symmetric 
outcomes are observed.
It is worth stressing that a necessary condition for such a SCE is that beliefs 
of majority and minority workers differ. If both groups have wrong but similar 
beliefs about the fraction of discriminatory employers, their behavior will also be 
similar, and balanced outcomes in terms of promotions should be expected. The 
dataset used in Chapter 4 provides interesting evidence that, although men and 
women share very similar expectations about the magnitude of the gender wage 
gap, the importance they assign to the underlying causes differs. In fact, while a 
larger fraction of men thinks that “actual differences between men and women” 
matter, a larger fraction of women points towards the “employers’ discriminatory 
tastes” as one of the causes for the expected gap.
Several implications arising from this model can be tested in the laboratory:
1. When beliefs are correct, workers’ behavior should not significantly depart 
from the Bayes-Nash Equilibrium of the game. In particular:
* when it is common knowledge that there is no discrimination, i.e. when the 
game is like a symmetric tournament, all workers should exert an inefficiently high 
level of effort;
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♦ when a known amount of discrimination affects workers’ behavior, there should 
not be systematic differences across populations. In other words, the effort exerted 
by majority and minority workers should decrease in a similar way.
2. Workers’ behavior should not differ across populations even when beliefs are 
wrong, provided that the two populations of workers share similar beliefs.
3. Workers who overestimate discrimination exert a lower effort than workers 
characterized by correct expectations. This is the key mechanism that might drive 
the labor market towards unequal outcomes even when discriminatory tastes have 
disappeared. In Chapter 2 a static framework is used and it is assumed that mi­
nority workers are those who might have wrong beliefs. Behind the static model 
there is an implicit dynamic: minority workers who have experienced direct dis­
crimination for a long period continue to expect being discriminated against even 
though discriminatory tastes have disappeared (hysteresis).
4. In the model it is assumed that players have costless access to aggregate 
outcomes that can be used to form their beliefs. An experiment can test to what 
extent subjects’ behavior is affected by aggregate information, as the literature on 
information cascades suggests.
3.3 The experiment
The game captures the main features of the model, presented in Chapter 2, that 
explores the role of workers’ expectations in explaining observed unequal outcomes. 
The game is much simpler than the model in order to be easily played. At the 
same time, the subjects are not aware of the underlying economic relations being 
tested. Thus, keywords like discrimination, labor market, employer, worker, male 
and female are never used. This minimizes the risk that idiosyncrasies might enter 
the experiment and confound the results.
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3 .3 .1  Sketch o f the gam e
Participants are randomly divided into two populations: red and blue. In every 
trial every participant has an endowment of 10 Euro cents and can decide how 
many cents to bid to get a prize worth 25 Euro cents. Bets are not given back to 
the players, neither to the winner nor to the loser, making the game equivalent to 
an all-pay auction. Therefore, at the end of the trial the winner gets 25 cents plus 
the amount not bet, while the loser only the amount not bet.
In every lottery there are only two participants, one from the red population 
and one from the blue population. The players know that they face only one 
opponent within every trial. Subjects are warned that it is possible to face the 
same opponent more than once during every session, but of course they do not 
know when, given that random assignment takes place at the beginning of each 
trial. The prize is awarded to the higher bid and it is split if bids are equal, unless 
the opponents are assigned to a “crazy computer,” which instead assigns the prize 
to the red player regardless of the bids. The fraction of crazy computers, and 
whether workers know it or not, vary across treatments (see section 3.3.3).
3 .3 .2  C ontrast and com parison w ith  th e  m od el
Similarities with the model in Chapter 2 are straightforward only if one knows 
that this model is what the experiment aims to test. Colors (red and blue) are 
the equivalent of gender (or race, etc.). The endowment of 10 cents is the same 
as the utility level when intermediate effort, i.e. the optimal level of effort when 
promotions are not an issue, is exerted. The amount bet plays the role of additional 
effort exerted to enhance the probability of being promoted. The prize stands for 
the promotion and, finally, the “crazy computers” play the role of discriminatory 
employers. The game is played under different parameter settings and information 
structures (see section 3.3.3).
Populations and number o f types
As already mentioned, red and blue labels are the equivalent of the payoff-irrelevant 
observable characteristic that distinguishes minority from majority workers. The 
color label is assigned randomly to every participant and lasts for the whole ex­
periment.
The role of the population of employers is played by the computers, which 
implements the employers’ equilibrium strategies in the model of Chapter 2. The 
crazy computers never assign the prize to the members of the blue population. 
The ‘fair computers” instead assign the prize to the player who made the higher 
offer and they split the prize when bids are equal. Hence, only the blue players 
risk being discriminated against.
In the theoretical model it is necessary to assume that workers are of different 
types for the employers to have some uncertainty about their productivity in the 
second period. In the experiment the distinction of different types would make 
the game much more complicated, given that subjects are not familiar with the 
concept of payoff-type. A further appreciable gain in simplicity is that, since the 
computers directly play the equilibrium strategy of the employers, it is unnecessary 
to play the second stage of the theoretical model.
Utility function and Nash Equilibria
The utility function used in the model is not implemented directly in the experi­
ment because it would be quite cumbersome to deal with it in the limited time-spell 
of the experiment (about 75 minutes). However, the game sketched in section 3.3.1 
implies a simplified but very close version of it. In both cases players have the op­
portunity to give up some utility with certainty in exchange for an uncertain but 
higher return. In the model, exerting a high effort is a sub-optimal decision con­
sidering the instantaneous utility function in the first period, but the loss of utility 
can be more than counterbalanced if the worker is promoted, since the job assigned
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Table 3.1:
Payoffs without crazy computers (Euro cents)
red;blue 0 1 2 ** • 9 10
0 22.5; 22.5 10; 34 10; 33 10; 26 10; 25
1 34; 10 21.5; 21.5 9; 33 9; 26 9; 25
2 33; 10 33; 9 20.5; 20.5 8; 26 8; 25
• • • ... ... ... ... ...
9 26; 10 26; 9 26; 8 13.5; 13.5 1; 25
10 25; 10 25; 9 25; 8 25; 1 12.5; 12.5
to the promoted workers is characterized by a lower cost of effort. On the other 
hand, if the worker is not promoted she suffers a net loss of utility compared to 
the choice of the “safe” option, i.e. intermediate effort. The risk of not being 
promoted has its counterpart in the possibility to bid without getting the prize in 
the experiment. However, also in this case the player has a “safe” option, which 
is bidding zero.
Table 3.1 summarizes the payoffs for the two players given the decision rule of 
a fair computer who assigns the prize to the subject bidding more and splits the 
prize when the bids are equal. For instance, the cell 22.5; 22.5 is associated with 
both subjects bidding zero and the prize being split. The only Nash equilibrium 
occurs when both players bid 10 cents. Hence, full dissipation of the endowments is 
predicted, not surprisingly given that this game is equivalent to an all-pay auction 
with the value of the prize exceeding the sum of the endowments.
This Nash equilibrium is not efficient, because both subjects would be better 
off playing 0, but in that case both would have the incentive to deviate bidding 
a positive quantity. This is similar to what happens in the theoretical model 
for the combination of parameters that displays a Bayes-Nash Equilibrium with 
both workers supplying a high effort. Given that the model imposes that one and 
only one worker is promoted, if both workers offered an intermediate effort, the 
probability of being promoted would be the same and both would have a higher 
utility in the first period. However, neither worker would be maximizing her utility
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Table 3.2:
red;blue 0 1 2 • 9 9 9 10
0 35; 10 35; 9 35; 8 35; 1 35; 0
1 34; 10 34; 9 34; 8 34; 1 34; 0
2 33; 10 33; 9 33; 8 33; 1 33; 0
• » • .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9 26; 10 26; 9 26; 8 26; 1 26; 0
10 25; 10 25; 9 25; 8 . . . 25; 1 25; 0
because she has a profitable deviation supplying a high effort.
Table 3.2 summarizes the payoffs for the two players given the decision rule 
of a crazy computer who always assigns the prize to the red player regardless of 
bids. Playing 0,0 is a dominant strategy for both, just as intermediate effort is a 
dominant strategy in the model when there are discriminatory employers only.
When there are both crazy and fair computers, payoffs are a linear combination 
of these two matrices, using as weight the fraction of crazy computers. When this 
fraction is unknown the equivalent of the expectation-driven SCE characterized 
by unequal outcomes may arise, as long as crazy computers have disappeared but 
Blues still believe there are some.
An important difference with respect to the model is that in the experiment 
bids are roughly continuous, while in the model the set of choices is restricted to 
low, intermediate and high effort. A roughly continuous set of choices is likely to 
reduce the probability of observing the SCE driven by wrong beliefs, since the cost 
of experimenting to discover the true state of nature becomes very low (see also 
section 3.4).
3 .3 .3  D esign  and procedure of th e  experim ent
One aspect of the experimental procedure needs to be stressed. All the treatments 
were proposed within each of the seven sessions of the experiment. Hence, all the
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subjects played facing the whole set of parameters. This procedure implies poten­
tial carryover effects from one parameter set to the others, as well as confounding 
factors arising because of framing, learning and fatigue. However, testing the ex­
istence of carryover effects (hysteresis) is one of the primary goals of this chapter, 
and therefore such an approach is necessary. Moreover, an econometric approach 
to the analysis of the data allows us to control for any observable and unobservable 
individual characteristic that might affect the choices of the participants during 
the experiment, including framing, learning and fatigue. To minimize the role of 
confounding factors, simultaneous parameter changes are avoided.
One of the testable implications concerned the role of information. For this 
reason in two sessions (3 and 4) subjects get information on all the outcomes 
within the session, in addition to their own outcomes, when the fraction of crazy 
computers is unknown (Treatments 2 and 6).
What follows is a sketch of the rules and the procedure of the experiment, which 
has been run using the zTree software.4 We recruited subjects from undergradu­
ate courses at the University of Milan. Most of the subjects were inexperienced. 
Participants were first randomly assigned numbers and seats. Subjects were told 
that their physical identity was not associated with their choices during the exper­
iment, the subjects’ numbers being their personal identification. They were given 
written instructions that were also read aloud by the experimenters, stressing that 
the amount they earned was a function of their decisions. In addition, instructions 
were also displayed on the screen at the beginning of each treatment.
Quiz 1. After questions are raised by subjects, a quiz is run to test their 
comprehension of the game. Given three different pairs of bids, they are asked to 
answer who is awarded the prize and to compute their earnings. If wrong answers 
are given, the subsequent screen shows the subject the correct answer and, in the
4 The zTVee software was developed at the University of Zurich, Institute for the Empirical 
Research in Economics (see Fischbacher, 2002).
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case of earnings, the way to compute them. Subjects are invited again to ask 
questions about anything that is not clear.
A ssignm ent to  red  or b lue population . The color of the population is 
then randomly assigned to every participant by means of an algorithm, in such a 
way that unobserved and uncontrolled characteristics are not correlated with the 
focus variables. The color is assigned once and for the whole experiment.
T rea tm en t 1 - 1 0  trials - Random matching of each Blue with a Red, with 
the possibility of facing the same opponent more than once. There is no “crazy 
computer” and players know it, i.e. the game is equivalent to an all-pay auction. 
Each subject is asked to  bid from 0 to 10 Euro cents in order to get the prize. The 
goal of this treatment is twofold. On the one hand, it makes subjects familiar with 
the game. On the other hand, it tests whether players cluster around the unique 
Nash Equilibrium with both players bidding 10 cents, i.e. fully dissipating then- 
endowment. Payoffs are reported in Table 3.1. After participants have decided, 
the computer displays:
a) how much the two opponents bid;
b) who wins the prize;
c) individual earnings.
In tro d u c tio n  of crazy com puters. After Treatment 1, the participants are 
told that some crazy computers, i.e. computers that assign the prize to the member 
of the red population regardless of the amounts bid, will be introduced into the 
game. During each treatment they might face both fair and crazy computers, but 
the type of the computer is never known in advance. It is made clear that in every 
trial there is a random matching with an opponent of the other population as well 
as with a  PC. Hence, the probability of facing a crazy computer is the same in 
every trial of each treatment and does not depend on the type of computer faced 
in previous trials.
Participants are warned tha t the maximum attention has been paid in order
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that every subject has the same expected reward. In particular, members of the 
blue population will receive an additional lump sum reward of 3.5 Euro to com­
pensate them for their lower chances of being awarded the prize. Hence, at the 
end of the experiment everybody will have had the same chance to earn the same 
expected reward with differences depending on participants’ actions only.5
Quiz 2. Subjects are then asked to answer another short quiz to test their 
comprehension of the game when crazy computers are introduced. Participants 
are asked:
a) to answer whether they are assigned the prize or not, and to compute their 
net position under four different circumstances in terms of bids or type of computer;
b) to compute their earnings and to infer the type of computer given four 
different pairs of bids and the associated decision about the prize.
In both cases, if wrong answers are given, the subsequent screen shows the 
subject the correct answer and, in the case of earnings, the way to compute them. 
Subjects are invited again to ask questions about anything that is not clear.
T reatm ent 2 - 1 5  trials - Random matching of each Blue with a Red, with 
the possibility of facing the same opponent more than once. There is no crazy 
computer but in this case players do not know this. They are just told that the 
fraction of crazy computers can range between 0% and 100% and that it is held 
constant during the treatment. Each subject is asked to bid in order to get the 
prize. In this case theoretical predictions are uncertain, since the best replies 
depend on beliefs and rationalizability does not allow us to delete any strategy. 
After each participant has decided the computer displays:
a) how much the two opponents bid;
5 The lump sum compensation has been introduced to prevent members of the blue population 
from feeling tempted to hinder the experiment. The amount of the compensation (3.5 Euro) was 
derived from the difference between the expected average earnings of Reds and Blues, had they 
followed the theoretical predictions. It turned out that the compensation was higher than the 
actual difference of earnings arisen during the experiment between Reds (11.05 Euro) and Blues 
(9.08 Euro).
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b) who wins the prize;
c) individual earnings.
In sessions 3 and 4 subjects access aggregate information as well. They are 
shown the distribution of bids among red and blue players, together with the 
percentage of Blues and Reds to whom the prize is assigned.
After statistics have been displayed, subjects are finally asked to report their 
beliefs about the actual fraction of crazy computers. Expectations are elicited 
implementing a lottery in which each subject has a probability of winning that is 
correlated with the number of times in which her beliefs are approximately (error 
< 5%) correct.
This treatment is used as bechmark to check how subjects plays when they do 
not know the fraction of crazy computers and without having experienced discrim­
ination. The same treatment is repeated after players experience discrimination 
(see Treatment 6). A significantly different behavior would point toward a persis­
tent effect of observed discrimination.
T reatm ent 3 - 5  trials - the same as Treatment 1 except that now there is a 
10% probability of facing a crazy computer and players know it. The goal of this 
treatment is twofold. On the one hand, it makes subjects familiar with the game 
when they know that crazy computers are introduced. On the other hand, it tests 
whether players over-react to the introduction of crazy computers, given that the 
unique Nash Equilibrium of the game predicts that both players should still bid 
10 cents, i.e. fully dissipating their endowment (expected payoffs are reported in 
Table 3.3). After each participant has decided, the computer displays the same 
information to all the players in all sessions, i.e. in this case even in sessions 3 and 
4 no one has access to aggregate information but only to individual statistics, and 
in particular:
a) how much the opponents offered;
b) who wins the prize;
72
Table 3.3:
Players’ payoffs with 10 percent crazy computers (Euro cents)
red;blue 0 1 2 9 10
0 23.75; 21.25 12.5; 31.5 12.5; 30.5 12.5; 23.5 12.25; 22.5
1 34; 10 22.75; 20.25 11.5; 30.5 11.5; 23.5 11.25; 22.5
2 33; 10 33; 9 21.75; 19.25 10.5; 23.5 10.25; 22.5
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9 26; 10 26; 9 26; 8 14.75; 12.25 3.5; 22.5
10 25; 10 25; 9 25; 8 25; 1 13.75; 11.25
c) individual earnings.
T reatm ent 4 - 5  trials - like Treatment 3 except that now there is a 50% 
probability of facing a crazy computer and players know it. As Table 3.4 shows, 
in this case there is no Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies, because a cycling 
pattern would emerge.6 Starting from the Nash Equilibrium of the previous treat­
ment (10; 10), blue players no longer find it convenient to make a positive bid, and 
therefore they prefer to drop out by bidding zero. This cannot be an equilibrium 
because red players could get the full prize by bidding 1 instead of 10, but at that 
point blue players would have a profitable deviation overbidding by one cent the 
opponent. The same would apply to red players and so on, until the mechanism 
starts again at (10,10). There is only one prediction: the average bid of Reds 
and Blues should not significantly differ. After participants decide, the computer 
displays the same individual statistics as in the previous treatment.
T reatm ent 5 - 5  trials - equal to Treatment 4 except that now there is a 90% 
probability of facing a crazy computer and players know it. As Table 3.5 shows,
6A mixed strategy equilibrium has been computed using a continuous support [0,10] for the 
strategy space:
- Reds assign a uniform distribution to the whole support g (s )  =  2/25, s € [0,10] and in 
addition p (s  = 0) =  1/5;
- Blues assign a uniform distribution to the whole support p($) =  2/25, s  € [0,10] and in 
addition p (s  — 10) =  1/5.
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Table 3.4:
Players’ payoffs with 50 percent crazy computers (Euro cents)
red;blue 0 1 2 • •• 9 10
0 28.75; 16.25 22.5; 21.5 22.5; 20.5 . .. 22.5; 13.5 22.25; 12.5
1 34; 10 27.75; 15.25 21.5; 20.5 . .. 21.5; 13.5 21.25; 12.5
2 33; 10 33; 9 26.75; 14.25 . .. 20.5; 13.5 20.25; 12.5
« « « . . . . . . . .. .. .
9 26; 10 26; 9 26; 8 .. . 19.75; 7.25 13.5; 12.5
10 25; 10 25; 9 25; 8 . . . 25; 1 18.75; 6.25
Table 3.5:
Players’ payoffs with 90 percent crazy computers (Euro cents)
| red;blue 0 1 2 ♦ ♦ ♦ 9 10
0 33.75; 11.25 32.5; 11.5 32.5; 10.5 ... 32.5; 3.5 32.25; 2.5
34; 10 32.75; 20.25 31.5; 10.5 ... 31.5; 3.5 31.25; 2.5
33; 10 33; 9 31.75; 9.25 ... 30.5; 3.5 30.25; 2.5
... . ... ... ...
26; 9 26; 8 ... 24.75; 2.25 23.5; 2.5
25; 9 25; 8 ... 25; 1 23.75; 1.25
although there is no Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies, it is possible to predict 
that both players should bid from 0 to 2 cents, because bidding more than 2 cents 
is never a best reply to any beliefs. Moreover, a mixed strategy equilibrium exists 
when both red and blue subjects assign the following probabilities: p(s =  0) =  
1/5;p(s — 1) =  3/5;p(s =  2) =  1/5. After the participants have decided, the 
computer displays the usual individual statistics.
T reatm ent 6 - 1 5  trials - Repetition of Treatment 2: random matching of 
each Blue with a Red, with the possibility of facing the same opponent more than 
once. There is no crazy computer but players do not know it; they are just told 
that the fraction of crazy computers can range between 0% and 100% and that 
it is held constant during the treatment. As in Treatment 2, individual statistics 
are displayed after the participants have decided, while in the same two sessions 
(3 and 4) subjects access aggregate information as well. This is identified as a
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different treatment because of carryover effects that might affect subjects’ behavior. 
Average bids that significantly differ from Treatment 2 would signal persistent 
effects of discrimination. Blues bidding less than Reds would be evidence in favor 
of the SCE in the model.
Since the set of choices in the experiment is roughly continuous, the SCE that 
may arise differs from the SCE in the model. As in the model, minority workers 
should choose the “safe” option, i.e. bidding zero (equivalent of intermediate ef­
fort), as long as they think there is a sufficiently high fraction of crazy computers. 
However, while in the model the majority workers would exert high effort, in the 
game it is enough that Reds bid 1 cent instead of 10 (which would be the equivalent 
of high effort) if they believe that the Blues play zero. In more detail, the SCE 
driven by wrong minority workers’ beliefs corresponds in the game to a situation 
in which:
• Reds bid 1 cent, which is a best reply to beliefs that crazy computers are up 
to 8% and that Blues bid zero.
• Blues think that at least 92% of the computers are crazy and that Reds bid 
1 cent. Given this beliefs bidding zero is a best reply.
• The prize is awarded to the Reds.7
T reatm ent 7 - 5  trials - Repetition of Treatment 3: 10% probability of fac­
ing a crazy computer and players know it. Again, this is identified as a separate
7 This SCEquilibrium is not unique. Another equilibrium is obtained simply flipping the color 
labels in the example above. However, only the equilibrium in which the prize is assigned to the 
Reds is consistent with the model. If the equilibrium in which the prize is assigned to the Blues 
occurs, it would be strong evidence against the model.
On the other hand, if all players believe that at least 92% of the computers are crazy and that 
the opponent play zero, both Reds and Blues should bid zero. However, in this case a few trials 
are enough to falsify players beliefs that there are many crazy computers, given that the prize 
would be split every time.
Finally, another Self-Confirming Equilibrium is supported by both subjects bidding the whole 
endowment and thinking that there are at most 20% of crazy computers.
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Ill I
Table 3.6:
Summary of rational play as predicted by pure strategy NE
Treatment Reds Blues
1 10 10
2 ? ?
3 10 10
4 ? ?
5 < 2 ____< 2
6 ? ?
7 10 10
treatment because of carryover effects that might affect subjects’ behavior. Sig­
nificantly different bids than in Treatment 3 would point toward persistent effects 
of discrimination. Blues bidding less than Reds would be evidence in favor of the 
SCE driven by wrong beliefs.
Table 3.6 summarizes the rational play, i.e. how many Euro cents subjects 
should bid, according to the Nash Equilibria in pure strategies.
S tra teg y  m ethod. - 5 trials - There is no crazy computer and players know 
it. Each subject is asked to  bid five times, every time after a different fictitious dis­
tribution of prizes between populations in the previous round has been displayed. 
This fictitious distribution shows a fraction of prizes won by the Blues decreasing 
from 80% to 0% in subsequent periods. In this case each subject wins the prize if 
her bid exceeds the average bid of the population of opponents. The individual re­
sults of each trial axe shown together after the fifth trial, so that they do not affect 
the choices of the subjects during the treatment. Since there is no crazy computer, 
and subjects know it, subjects of both populations should dissipate entirely their 
endowment and pay no attention to the aggregate statistics.
At the end of the experiment a questionnaire is proposed, reminding partici­
pants that their physical identity was not associated with their choices and their 
answers during the experiment. Questions concerned academic as well as personal 
information. In section 3.3.4 some descriptive statistics of the pool of subjects are
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summarized.
70 subjects participated in the experiment, which consisted of seven sessions. 
The sessions lasted approximately 75 minutes and were composed of a minimum 
of 8 and a maximum of 12 subjects. Euro cents were the currency used during the 
experiment. Earnings ranged between 9 and 15.5 Euros (11.8 on average). Average 
earnings of the Reds were lower than average earnings of the Blues once the lump 
sum compensation of 3.5 Euros was taken into account. (11.05 Euro vs. 9.08+3.5 
Euro, respectively).
3 .3 .4  Sam ple description
From the information collected by means of the final questionnaire, it turns out 
that males are over-represented in our sample (67% vs. 33%), and that the average 
age of the pool is about 21 years. Most of the participants (89%) comes from 
the School of Political Sciences, and is enrolled in the third year of the degree 
program. The final mark at the exit of secondary school was chosen as a proxy 
for a student’s ability; the variable has been rescaled in the range [0,1]. Two 
thirds of the sample come from high schools (licei) and one fourth from technical 
schools (istituti tecnici). Two specific questions were asked concerning political 
and religious orientation. An ordered scale from 0 to 5 has been used to ask 
subjects about their political orientation (0=left; 5=right), without any label on 
each possible choice. Two thirds of the subjects report themselves as being center- 
left, i.e. they chose a value from 0 to 2, and 33% center-right. The average choice 
is 1.97 while the median choice is 2. With respect to religion, the subjects have 
been asked to choose from three alternatives: “believer and churchgoer,” “believer 
but not churchgoer,” “non-believer.” The proportion of the last occurrence was 
around one third.
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3.4 Results
Prom the quizzes it is possible to infer that subjects have a good albeit imperfect 
comprehension of the game, given that the average number of wrong answers is 
about 1.4 out of 6 questions in the first quiz, and 2.5 out of 16 in the quiz with 
crazy computers.
The results confirm the prediction implied by the Nash equilibrium of the game 
where subjects know that there is no crazy computer (T reatm ent 1), i.e. that they 
should fully dissipate their endowment and bid 10 cents. In fact, the average bid 
is 9.14 cents. In the last trial of Treatment 1, 64 out of 70 subjects fully dissipate 
their endowment. The distribution of prizes is balanced across populations, in line 
with predictions. The prize is split in 63.7% of the games, while Reds win 16.6% of 
the games and Blues 19.7%. In the last trial of the Treatment the prize is split in 
30 out of 35 games. Table 3.7 reports the average bid of each population, session by 
session, pooling all periods. The last row summarizes the same statistics pooling 
all the sessions. Blues display a propensity to bid more than Reds in session 
5, although the difference is not statistically significant at the 10% confidence 
level. In fact, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test does not reject the equality of the 
distribution functions (p:0.112). In the other sessions, as well as in the pooled 
sample, the behavior of red and blue subjects is very similar, in line with the 
theoretical predictions.
Let’s skip for one moment the analysis of Teatm ent 2. When a known and 
small fraction (10%) of crazy computers is introduced (T reatm ent 3), some sub­
jects slightly over-react (see Table 3.8). In fact, while the small fraction of crazy 
computers does not affect the prediction of full dissipation of the endowment, the 
average bid decreases to 8.3 cents with a higher variability. This is particularly ev­
ident in session 3 and, to a minor extent, in sessions 2, 4, 6 and 7. Reds and Blues 
display a pattern that is not significantly different in each session or in the pooled 
sample, in line with predictions. Unequal outcomes emerge as a consequence of
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Table 3.7:
Treatment 1: average bid (st dev) and distribution of prize winners
Session
(Subjects)
Average bid 
red  blue
Kolmogorov- 
Smirnov te s t
Prize winners 
red split blue
1 (10) 9.82(0.66) 9.70(0.81) p; 1.000 6 41 3
2 (10) 9.58(1.39) 9.76(0.72) p:l.000 5 37 8
3 (10) 9.02(2.80) 9.56(1.51) p: 0.998 8 37 5
4 (8) 8.95(1.28) 8.57(2.51) p;0.579 11 14 15
5 (10) 7.44(3.92) 8.92(2.55) p:0.112 9 23 18
6 (10) 9.80(1.28) 9.76(0.85) p : l .m 5 43 2
7 (12) 8.62(2.73) 8.63(2.76) p:0.928 14 28 18
pooled (70) 9.02(2.42) 9.27(1.93) p:0.942 58 223 69
Table 3.8:
Treatment 3: average bid (st dev) and distribution of prize winners
Session
(Subjects)
Average bid 
red blue
Kolmogorov- 
Smirnov te s t
Prize winners 
red split blue
1 (10) 9.60(0.66) 9.88(0.60) p.T.000 2 22 1
2 (10) 7.20(4.20) 9.32(2.08) p;0.285 7 11 7
3 (10) 7.16(4.33) 6.40(4.25) p:0.710 11 7 7
4 (8) 8.45(2.43) 7.75(3.93) p/0.832 7 5 8
5 (10) 7.88(3.26) 8.76(2.17) p:0.915 9 8 8
6 (10) 9.60(1.38) 8.04(3.79) p:0.915 5 19 1
7 (12) 8.27(3.49) 7.83(3.58) p/0.958 13 12 5
pooled (70) 8.30(3.29) 8.29(3.28) p: 1.000 54 84 37
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Table 3.9:
Treatment 4: average bid (st dev) and distribution of prize winners
Session
(Subjects)
A verage b id  
red  b lue
Kolm ogorov- 
Sm irnov te s t
P rize  winners 
red  split blue
1 (10) 4.80(4.72) 3.72(4.42) p;0.475 17 5 3
2 (10) 5.20(4.06) 4.32(4.12) p:0.475 22 2 1
3 (10) 1.12(1.39) 5.96(3.77) p:0.000 13 0 12
4 (8) 2.65(3.72) 4.40(3.91) p:0.034 15 2 3
5 (10) 4.28(3.32) 4.72(4.01) p:0.710 22 1 2
6 (10) 6.76(4.32) 5.84(4.52) p;0.915 16 6 3
7 (12) 3.80(4.02) 4.77(3.94) p:0.071 18 3 9
pooled (70) 4.12(4.09) 4.83(4.11) p;0.313 123 19 33
the crazy computers, with Blues winning only 21.1% of the prizes against 30.8% 
of the Reds.
When the fraction of crazy computers increases to 50% in T reatm ent 4, the 
average bid decreases sharply to 4.47 cents (4.12 the Reds, 4.83 the Blues), with 
Blues bidding clearly more than Reds in most of the sessions. The Kolmogorov- 
Smirnov test rejects the equality of distribution functions in session 3 (p=0.000), 
4 (p=0.034) and 7 (p=0.071), while the difference is not statistically significant in 
the other sessions or in the pooled sample (see Table 3.9). The effect of the high 
fraction of crazy computers is overwhelmingly stronger than the effect of the higher 
offers of blue subjects in determining the distribution of prize winners (70.2% Reds 
Vs 18.8% Blues).
When in T rea tm en t 5 90% of computers are crazy, the average bid (1.52 cents) 
stays within the predicted range of [0,2] cents, but there is a lot of variability across 
sessions. As Table 3.10 shows, red subjects bid on average a quantity that cannot 
be a best reply to any beliefs in sessions 2, 6 and 7. Reds bid significantly more than 
Blues in session 2, while the opposite happens in sessions 3 and 4. The difference is 
not statistically significant in the other sessions or in the pooled sample (p=0.203). 
Unequal outcomes become particularly severe, with Reds winning the prize 93.7% 
of the times, against 4.6% of the Blues.
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Table 3.10:
Treatment 5: average bid (st dev) and distribution of prize winners
Session
(Subjects)
Average bid 
red blue
Kolmogorov- 
Smirnov test
Prize winners 
red split blue
1 (10) 0.96(1.65) 0.92(2.16) p;0.915 24 0 1
2 (10) 3.88(3.55) 1.28(2.11) p;0.015 24 0 1
3 (10) 0.36(0.56) 2.00(2.19) p;0.002 23 2 0
4 (8) 0.15(0.67) 1.85(2.87) p:0.000 17 0 3
5 (10) 0.72(0.68) 0.80(1.44) p:0.996 24 1 0
6 (10) 3.08(4.14) 1.44(2.61) p:0.710 23 0 2
7 (12) 2.07(3.68) 1.53(2.10) p.0.135 29 0 1
pooled (70) 1.66(2.94) 1.39(2.23) p;0.203 164 3 8
Summarizing, subjects follow rather well the theoretical predictions when the 
fraction of crazy computers is known. This is particularly true in session 1, where 
deviations from the predicted behavior axe negligible. Some departures from the 
predicted behavior are worth noting, however. In sessions 3 and 4 Blues have the 
propensity to bid significantly more than Reds when a sufficiently large fraction 
of crazy computers is introduced. This happens also in one case in session 7. 
In session 2 red players react to the presence of a negligible fraction of crazy 
computers. Also in session 6 (blue players) and in session 3 (all players) there is 
evidence of over-reaction when the fraction of crazy computers is negligible. Reds 
offer on average an amount higher than rationalizable in sessions 2, 6 an 7 when 
many crazy computers are introduced.
The analysis of T reatm ent 2, the first with the fraction of crazy computers 
equal to zero but unknown to the players, shows a high variability both between 
and within sessions. This is not surprising, given that any bid can be a best reply 
given some beliefs about the fraction of crazy computers and about the opponent’s 
strategy. What is interesting is the fact that disadvantaged players bid on average 
significantly more than the opponents in three out of seven sessions (3, 5 and 7). In 
session 7 this happens because only red players significantly react to the possibility 
that crazy computers are introduced after Treatment 1, while blue players do not.
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Table 3.11:
Treatment 2 - all periods: average bid (st dev) and distribution of prize winners
Session
(Subjects)
Average bid 
red blue
Kolm ogorov- 
Sm irnov te s t
P rize  winners 
red  split blue
1 (10) 8.97(2.48) 8.07(3.90) p:0.518 14 46 15
2 (10) 7.16(4.03) 7.72(3.31) p:0.395 14 39 22
3 (10) 5.90(4.62) 6.81(3.62) p .0.010 26 19 30
4 (8) 5.93(4.25) 5.01(4.22) p:0.375 28 8 24
5 (10) 5.21(4.06) 6.67(3.50) p:0.042 27 7 41
6 (10) 9.07(2.04) 8.69(2.68) p;0.996 18 44 13
7 (12) 6.70(4.36) 7.78(3.56) p:0.081 22 38 30
pooled (70) 7.01(4.04) 7.33(3.68) p:0.030 149 201 175
In session 5 both populations significantly reduce their bids in a similar way, but 
Blues offer more than Reds also in Treatment 1, when it is known that there was 
no crazy computer. In session 3 both populations significantly reduce their bids, 
but Reds more than Blues. In a nutshell, the announcement that there is the 
possibility of facing crazy computers significantly affects the behavior of most of 
the subjects, but in some cases Reds react more than Blues.8
The fraction of crazy computers being unknown, it is interesting to see what 
happens when the analysis is restricted to the last 5 periods of the treatment, when 
subjects have the possibility of learning from their experience (and in sessions 3 
and 4 also from aggregate statistics) the true state of nature, i.e. that there is, 
in fact, no crazy computer. Data reported in Table 3.12 show that learning takes 
place. In all the sessions the average bid is higher at the end of the treatment 
with the exception of blue players in session 3 and red players in session 4, the two 
sessions where aggregate information is available. However, evidence is not strong 
enough to claim that players in these two cases are learning the “wrong” SCE with 
discrimination.
8The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test does not reject at 10% confidence the invariance of players’ 
behavior between treatments 1 and 2 only in sessions 1 and 6 and only for blue players in session 
7. These statistics are not reported in detail in order to save space, but are available from the 
author.
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Table 3.12:
Treatment 2 - first 5 and last 5 periods: average bid (st dev)
Session
(Subjects)
Beginning of Treatment 2 
Average bid 
red | blue
End o f Treatment 2 
Average bid 
red | blue
1 (10) 7.88(3.01) 6.60(4.66) 9.96(0.20) 9.60(2.00)
2 (10) 6.92(4.38) 7.36(5.39) 7.72(3.77) 8.04(3.31)
3 (10) 6.28(4.70) 7.28(3.21) 7.00(4.39) 6.32(3.91)
4 (8) 6.15(4.46) 4.35(4.16) 5.60(4.33) 5.20(4.25)
5 (10) 3.08(3.29) 6.04(3.06) 6.56(3.90) 7.60(3.58)
6 (10) 8.00(2.55) 7.68(3.56) 9.80(1.00) 9.32(1.89)
7 (12) 5.73(4.33) 7.10(3.89) 7.47(4.30) 8.13(3.51)
pooled (70) 6.28(4.13) 6.70(3.82) 7.78(3.76) 7.83(3.52)
Table 3.13:
Treatment 6 - all periods: average bid (st dev) and distribution of prize winners
Session
(Subjects)
Average bid 
red blue
Kolmogorov- 
Smirnov test
Prize winners 
red split blue
1 (10) 9.64(1.70) 9.08(2.77) p;0.996 9 63 3
2 (10) 7.21(4.04) 9.67(1.18) p:0.002 6 43 26
3 (10) 7.08(4.45) 6.12(3.77) p.0.003 31 12 31
4 (8) 5.33(3.99) 5.20(3.95) p:0.047 27 7 26
5 (10) 6.35(4.35) 8.01(3.10) p:0.016 16 25 34
6 (10) 9.96(0.35) 9.63(1.50) p:0.996 5 69 1
7 (12) 9.32(2.39) 8.97(2.70) p:0.948 14 69 7
pooled (70) 7.96(3.69) 8.20(3.23) p:0.050 108 299 118
Let us move to the repetition of the same treatment after subjects have faced 
an increasing fraction of crazy computers (10%, 50% and 90%), summarized in 
Table 3.13. In sessions 2 and 5 Blues offer significantly more than Reds, while in 
session 3 Reds bid significantly more than Blues.
One of the key questions this chapter tries to answer is how subjects’ behavior 
differs before and after having experienced the experiment’s version of discrimi­
natory tastes. In sessions 5, 6 and 7 subjects bid significantly more after having 
faced crazy computers than before. This also happens to Reds in session 1 and 
to Blues in session 2, respectively. In the other cases significant differences do not
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Table 3.14:
Treat. 2, last 5 periods; Treat. 6, first 5 and last 5 periods: average bid (st dev)
E nd o f T reatm ent 2 Beginning of TVeat. 6 E nd of Treatm ent 2
A verage bid A verage b id Average bid
red 1 blue red blue red blue
1 9.96(0.20) 9.60(2.00) 9.32(2.17) 8.00(4.08) 9.60(2.00) 9.40(2.29)
2 7.72(3.77) 8.04(3.31) 8.20(3.49) 9.32(1.84) 6.80(4.40) 10.00(0.00)
3 7.00(4.39) 6.32(3.91) 7.04(4.49) 5.20(3.62) 6.40(4.90) 6.80(3.85)
4 5.60(4.33) 5.20(4.25) 5.50(3.90) 3.75(3.49) 5.30(4.23) 6.30(4.01)
5 6.56(3.90) 7.60(3.58) 5.52(4.38) 6.96(3.51) 6.36(4.59) 8.96(2.32)
6 9.80(1.00) 9.32(1.89) 9.88(0.60) 9.20(2.00) 10.00(0.00) 9.68(1.60)
7 7.47(4.30) 8.13(3.51) 8.63(3.19) 9.00(2.46) 10.00(0.00) 8.53(3.34)
7.78(3.76) 7.83(3.52) 7.82(3.69) 7.50(3.49) 7.91(3.85) 8.58(3.01)
emerge, but a significant decrease of bids is never observed. At first glance, this 
finding is rather puzzling given that the opposite should be expected following the 
predictions in Chapter 2. However, as Table 3.14 shows, restricting our attention 
to the beginning of T rea tm en t 6 as opposed to the end of treatment 2, it turns 
out that in sessions 1, 3 and 4 Blues reduce their bids, while Reds do not. In 
theory, this should lead to the SCE driven by wrong beliefs to emerge, but this 
effect on disadvantaged subjects’ behavior is short-lived and vanishes during the 
treatment. In fact, at the end of the treatment red and blue subjects behave in a 
very similar way in most of the sessions.
Hence, evidence about hysteresis is rather weak, because the finding that, after 
having been discriminated against, Blues bid less than Reds and receive a lower 
fraction of prizes is not long-lasting. Although a SCE with wrong beliefs is some­
thing that can happen but cannot be expected to emerge regularly, evidence is not 
fully satisfactory if evaluated from the point of view of the testable implication 3 
above. The main reason the experiment does not provide strong evidence in favor 
of unequal outcomes driven by subjects’ expectations, is that the experiment failed 
to separate the beliefs of the two populations. In the theoretical model different 
expectations about the fraction of discriminatory employers are a necessary condi-
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tion for the SCE to be observed, but in the lab Blues never expect a clearly higher 
fraction of crazy computers than Reds. A possible explanation for this finding 
is that the experimental design overemphasized the discontinuity between treat* 
ments, preventing carryover effects from entering the picture. Another possible 
explanation could be that the set of choices was roughly continuous. This induces 
a very slight difference in the optimal behavior of advantaged and disadvantaged 
subjects, and therefore also a very low cost of experimenting to discover the true 
state of nature. Were the choice set dichotomized (e.g. 0, 5 and 10 cents), it would 
be more costly to experiment and the Self-Confirming Equilibrium would be more 
likely to emerge.
From T rea tm en t 7, i.e. the repetition of treatment 3 after subjects face an 
increasing fraction of crazy computers, subjects’ behavior does not change, with 
the exception in session 4 of Reds who significantly reduce their bid.9
Quite surprisingly, given the evidence from the comparison of TVeatments 2 
and 6, the strategy method shows evidence supporting the Self-Confirming Equi­
librium driven by wrong beliefs. In fact, advantaged and disadvantaged subjects 
react in a different way when ad hoc aggregate statistics are displayed showing 
a fraction of prizes won by the Blues decreasing from 80% to 0% in subsequent 
periods. The subjects are told that there is no crazy computer. Hence, subjects of 
both populations should pay no attention to the aggregate statistics and entirely 
dissipate their endowment. On the contrary, as the fictitious distribution of prizes 
becomes less and less favorable to blue players, their offers decrease. On the other 
hand, red players do not change their behavior significantly (see Table 3.15).
As a result, the fraction of blue players bidding more than the average of their 
opponents also decreases from 74.3% in the first period of the strategy method, 
when the distribution of prizes was supposed to be more favorable, to 25.7% in the
9These statistics are not reported in detail in order to save space, but are available from the 
author.
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Table 3.15:
Strategy method: average bid (st. dev) across populations period by period
Percentage o f prizes announced to  be won by Blues
pop 80 60 40 20 0
i red 6.80(4.20) 8.00(2.24) 8.80(1.00) 9.00(1.58) 8.60(2.86)
1 blue 8.80(1.98) 8.60(2.00) 4.00(3.82) 3.40(4.39) 0.00(0.00)
2 red 8.80(1.98) 9.00(1.29) 7.60(3.96) 3.20(3.32) 4.20(4.85)
2 blue 9.40(1.22) 9.00(1.29) 6.40(3.07) 2.20(4.00) 2.00(4.85)
3 red 4.20(4.85) 5.20(4.58) 7.20(4.00) 7.20(4.00) 4.40(4.68)
3 blue 7.80(1.75) 8.00(1.71) 7.80(2.45) 6.80(4.00) 3.60(4.55)
4 red 7.00(4.23) 5.75(3.43) 5.00(3.16) 5.75(3.73) 4.25(4.49)
4 blue 8.00(2.05) 8.25(1.97) 4.50(4.26) 4.00(4.35) 3.75(4.25)
5 red 6.20(4.40) 8.80(2.45) 8.60(1.53) 9.40(0.82) 7.60(3.57)
5 blue 7.20(3.73) 10.00(0.00) 8.00(1.94) 6.00(5.00) 4.20(4.85)
6 red 8.00(4.08) 7.60(3.27) 9.80(0.40) 10.00(0.00) 10.00(0.00)
6 blue 8.20(3.67) 7.40(2.55) 7.60(3.96) 2.60(3.85) 4.20(4.85)
7 red 6.00(4.23) 8.17(2.65) 7.33(3.60) 9.50(0.77) 7.00(4.35)
7 blue 7.16(3.44) 7.50(2.33) 4.67(2.86) 3.67(4.57) 3.17(4.00)
pooled red 6.69(4.25) 7.57(3.22) 7.83(3.15) 7.83(3.33) 6.66(4.37)
pooled blue 8.06(2.83) 8.37(2.04) 6.14(3.57) 4.09(4.54) 2.97(4.27)
fifth period without any change in fundamentals. What happens in all sessions is 
that blue players axe influenced by the aggregate statistics showing that less and 
less of them has won the prize, inducing them to bid less. In turn, their lower bids 
make them less likely to win, leading to unequal outcomes that are consistent with 
wrong expectations that they were less likely to get the prize.
Given the design of the experiment, and in particular that every subject is 
exposed to the whole set of parameter changes, a regression analysis of the data 
is certainly informative. The limitations imposed by the very low number of inde­
pendent observations prevent inference from being reliable. However, the interpre­
tation of a regression as a conditional expectation function is not at all affected by 
the low number of independent observations and sheds more light on the data. In 
a multivariate framework, with players’ bids as a dependent variable, where fixed 
effects control for any observable or unobservable individual characteristic, session
8 6
fixed effects display a high heterogeneity. The fraction of crazy computers, or in­
dividual beliefs when the fraction of crazy computers is not known, is obviously 
the most important variable in explaining the variation of bids, accounting for a 
0.61 cents lower bid every 10% of crazy computers. It is not, however, the only 
one. The dummy variable for the population shows that, everything else being 
equal, the blue players have a propensity to bid much more (3.5 cents). As far as 
the learning and framing effects, bids tend to increase within treatments where the 
fraction of crazy computers is not announced, while across treatments a U-shaped 
negative effect emerges, with a minimum in treatment 4 where bids are ceteris 
paribus about 1.3 cents lower than in treatments 1 and 7.
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3.5 Literature review
Although the role of workers’ expectations in explaining unequal outcomes has 
never been the focus of experiments, several contributions to the literature are 
relevant as far as this experiment is concerned. They can be divided into three 
groups:
1. Discrimination and asymmetric tournaments.
2. Information cascades, sunspot and hysteresis.
3. All-pay auctions.
3 .5 .1  E xperim ental studies o f d iscrim ination  and asym ­
m etric tournam ents
Experiments closely related to the experiment presented in this chapter are those 
concerning either statistical discrimination or asymmetric tournaments. This sub­
section concentrates on experiments based on economic factors. A survey of many 
other experiments based on group identification or status can be found in Ander­
son, Fryer and Holt (2002).
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The literature concerning experimental studies of discrimination is thin and in 
general not directly related to the experiment presented in this chapter, with a few 
exceptions. Ftyer, Goeree and Holt (2002b) describe the results of experiments 
that may produce (and sometimes do) a pattern of experience-based discrimina­
tion consistent with the statistical discrimination models proposed by Arrow (1973) 
and Phelps (1972). Employers have to decide whether to hire or not workers from 
two otherwise identical populations, “green” and “purple.” The hiring decision is 
affected by an observable test score, which in turn depends on a worker’s (unob­
served) investment decision, like education or training. The cost of investing is 
random and it is set to be systematically higher for the workers of one population 
during the first ten out of sixty rounds, while from the eleventh onward it drawn 
from the same distribution. Moreover, players have access to aggregate informa­
tion, given that the average investment and hiring percentages for the workers of 
each color are displayed at the end of each round. The authors find that a different 
average investment emerges, and then a lasting and self-reinforcing mechanism op­
erates in such a way that fewer workers of that group are hired, the fraction of that 
group of workers investing decreases even further and so on, leading to multiple 
equilibria with discrimination.10 There are certain dimensions in which this exper­
iment should be explicitly compared with that presented above. In particular, it 
is worth noting that, similarly to the experiment described in this chapter:
a) there is a  real effect (the different distributions from which investment costs 
are drawn) tha t is withdrawn during the experiment, but that have long-lasting 
effects (hysteresis);
b) aggregate statistics are used to convey information to players, although 
there is no specific treatment focusing on the presence vs. absence of aggregate 
information.
l0Fryer, Goeree and Holt (2002a) present classroom experiments very similar to Fryer, Goeree 
and Holt (2002b), but where a clear relation going from a higher average cost to a lower propensity 
to invest does not emerge.
8 8
c) there is an endogenous decision (investing or not) that makes ex ante equal 
populations potentially different in equilibrium.
Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis (2002) use the Hawk-Dove game to show that 
starting from two populations that differ because of a payoff-irrelevant observable 
characteristic only (red and blue label), different roles associated with different 
payoffs (i.e. discriminatory conventions) may emerge. Lohm (2000) finds in a 
Battle of the Sexes experiment that females are more likely to be discriminated 
against by other females.11
The literature concerning experimental studies of asymmetric tournaments is 
more established and some papers can fruitfully be used as a benchmark, in par­
ticular Schotter and Weigelt (1992) and Bull, Schotter and Weigelt (1987). The 
former presents an experiment aiming to test the theoretical predictions of the 
asymmetric tournament theory as presented by O’Keeffe, Viscusi, and Zeckhauser 
(1984). In particular, they focus on the predicted trade-off between equity and 
efficiency associated with affirmative actions, finding contrary evidence.
From the theoretical point of view, asymmetric tournaments have many things 
in common with the model in Chapter 2. In line with the old saying that different 
opinions are necessary for a horse race to take place, both involve uncertainty. 
What distinguishes them is the fact that effort is not perfectly observable in the 
asymmetric tournament literature, while incomplete information about the oppo­
nents’ type-strategy set characterizes Chapter 2. Furthermore, the two approaches 
share most of their predictions, in particular that the behavior of advantaged and 
disadvantaged workers should change in a similar way when discrimination is com­
mon knowledge.
11 Other experiments concerning statistical discrimination have been proposed by Davis (1987) 
and Anderson and Haupert (1999), both relying on exogenous differences that characterize the 
two populations. The former finds weak evidence that the larger population has better outcomes. 
The latter provides evidence that workers belonging to a population characterized by a lower 
average innate productivity are less likely to be hired, with the likelihood depending on the cost 
of discovering the individuad type. Strictly speaking, it can be argued that the framework of 
these experiments cannot be classified as discrimination.
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The experiment presented by Schotter and Weigelt (1992) can be used as a 
benchmark also from the methodological point of view. Two points are particu­
larly relevant. First, the authors want to avoid carryover effects from one treatment 
to another. Consequently, each subject is allowed to participate in one treatment 
only. In the present chapter, instead, the main goal is to test the existence of 
hysteresis, and therefore carryover effects are part of the picture. Hence, the treat­
ments are designed in such a way that every subject faces both a symmetric game 
and situations characterized by discrimination. Second, in the experiment pro­
posed by Schotter and Weigelt (1992) players are matched once and for all within 
every session. This is more likely to lead to cooperation, or at least to strategic 
interaction, that would instead disappear with a random matching repeated before 
every period (see Duffy and Ochs (2003)),
The experiment just described closely follows an earlier experiment by Bull, 
Schotter and Weigelt (1987), where asymmetries and affirmative actions were not 
the main focus. It is worth noting that both experiments report a tendency of dis­
advantaged workers to over-supply effort in uneven tournaments, as if asymmetries 
elicit greater effort.12 Moreover, Schotter and Weigelt (1992) show that advantaged 
workers make more effort than predicted in unfair tournaments. Section 3.4 shows 
evidence that disadvantaged players sometimes over-bid in unfair contests, while 
some evidence emerges that advantaged players bid more than predicted when the 
rules of the tournament are particularly favorable.
3 .5 .2  A ll-p a y  auctions
All-pay auctions are characterized by the fact that bids are given back neither 
to the winner nor to the loser. The model behind the experiment is related to an 
all-pay auction, insofar as there is no compensation for the loss of utility that a non-
12Asymmetric contests are defined “uneven” when agents are different, and “unfair” when 
contestants are identical but the rules favor one of them.
90
promoted worker suffers when he have exerted an effort higher than the level that 
would be optimal if promotion was not an issue. In an all-pay auction the prize goes 
to the highest bidder, so that each player has the incentive to overbid the others, 
as long as this ensures a positive payoff.13 When the value of the prize exceeds 
the sum of the endowments an equilibrium in pure strategies exists, implying full 
dissipation of the endowments. Otherwise, in symmetric all-pay auctions, the result 
that the sum of the expected bids equals the value of the prize is supported by 
mixed strategies equilibria (Baye, Kovenock and de Vries, 1996). Rational agents 
never over-dissipate the value of the rent if they have the opportunity to bid zero. 
However, a relaxation of the rationality via the possibility of decision errors is 
enough to support a theoretical framework where over-dissipation can be observed 
(see Anderson, Goeree and Holt, 1998) consistently with experimental evidence 
like Davis and Reilly (1998).14
The promotion game without discrimination in Chapter 2, which is also tested 
in this experiment, is equivalent to an all-pay auction. Not surprisingly, the Nash 
equilibrium is a comer solution where endowments are fully dissipated. It might 
be feasible to increase the value of the endowment (or to decrease the value of the 
prize) to test also for over-dissipation. However, this goes beyond the goal of this 
chapter.
13 The literature on sym m etric rank-order tournaments started by Lazeax and Rosen (1981) 
shares some of the features concerning all-pay auctions.
14 When within such a framework subsequent bids are allowed before the prize is assigned, it is 
easy to observe that bidding spirals out of control, as in the Dollar Auction Game presented by 
Shubik (1971), where a dollar is awarded to the highest bid. Since the expenditures are sunk, it 
would be rational to increase a bet whenever doing so increases the expected return more than the 
amount of the additional bet. There is no stable equilibrium (at least in pure strategies) as long 
as the endowment of each player exceeds the value of the prize. When one bid exceeds the value 
of the prize, the motivation of the remaining bidders changes from a desire to maximize returns to 
one of m inimi7ing losses. Thus, the question transforms from “How much can I win?” to “How 
do I keep from losing?” and escalation is easily observed, like in the classroom experiments 
described by Mumigham (2001).
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3 .5 .3  In form ation  cascades, su n sp ots an d  hysteresis
This experiment is also related to the strand of literature on information cascades 
(or herd behavior) started by Banerjee (1992) and Bickchandani, Hirshleifer and 
Welch (1992). Information cascades occur when the initial decisions of other play­
ers coincide in a way that it is optimal for each of the subsequent individuals to 
ignore his or her private signals and follow the established pattern. Particularly 
interesting as far as this chapter is concerned is the sub-case of a reverse cascade 
(also called bad herd, or lemming type behavior), which happens when the first 
decision-makers choose the incorrect state of the world, and the followers join the 
resulting pattern of mistakes despite the fact that their private signals are more 
likely to indicate the correct state. In Chapter 2 reverse cascades can justify the 
Self-Confirming Equilibrium with unequal outcomes when discriminatory tastes 
have disappeared, since workers access aggregate information that might affect 
subjects’ behavior over and above individual outcomes. Anderson and Holt (1997) 
provide evidence from the lab of the existence of such information cascades, and, to 
a minor extent, of reverse cascades. Hey and Morone (2002) show that lemmings 
survive even within a market contest.
The theoretical sunspot model postulates that agents believe that a variable, 
which is in fact unrelated to the economy, has real effects, and shows that such 
beliefs can induce the agents to behave in a manner that provides support for 
the postulated beliefs. Sunspots were introduced to the laboratory by Woodford 
(1990), who shows that cyclic sunspot equilibria can asymptotically emerge in an 
OLG framework when agents follow some adaptive learning schemes. Marimon, 
Spear and Sunder (1993) do not find evidence that sunspot equilibria exist when 
the extrinsic variable is not correlated with some real shock. However, they do find 
evidence that sunspots matter, taking the form of common past experience that 
influences agents behavior even when the real shock (correlated with sunspots) 
has been removed. This is a combination of hysteresis, i.e. the lagging of an effect
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behind its cause, and sunspots. What the experiment in section 3.3 tries to figure 
out is the existence of hysteresis without sunspots. In this case discriminatory 
tastes axe the key variable that has real effects and that is withdrawn, while there is 
no extrinsic signal that drives the behavior of agents after the real shock disappears.
The paper by Bull, Schotter and Weigelt (1987), already mentioned when talk­
ing about asymmetric tournaments, is relevant also as far as the role of information 
is concerned. Giving contestants additional, but not complete, information about 
the actions of their opponents appears to slow the rate at which agents converge 
on their optimal choice. Section 3.4 shows that no significant differences are as­
sociated with the behavior of players accessing aggregate statistics in addition to 
individual outcomes.
3.6 Conclusions
This chapter is aimed at testing the predictions of a model that explores the role of 
workers’ expectations of being discriminated against as an original explanation for 
the puzzling long-run persistence of observed discrimination against some minori­
ties in the labor market. The model, presented in Chapter 2, provides a theoretical 
framework based on a two-stage game of incomplete information where preferences 
and beliefs of both sides of the labor market matter. In every constituent game 
two workers, one of whom is a minority worker, are drawn from their ex ante 
identical populations and randomly matched with one employer.15 At the end of 
the first period the employer promotes one (and only one) worker after having 
observed the output they have produced, which is a function of their observable 
effort. Crucially, promotions depend via effort on workers’ expectations about the 
unknown employer’s type, which captures his possible disutility of promoting a 
minority worker. The importance of workers’ expectations can be appreciated by
13 What distinguishes the population of minority workers is an observable characteristic not 
related to their productivity (e.g. race, gender).
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comparing the distribution of promotions across populations that arises when mi­
nority workers overestimate the percentage of employers characterized by tastes 
for discrimination with a situation in which such beliefs are correct ceteris paribus. 
This difference becomes crystal clear when there are actually only employers who 
do not discriminate against the minority either directly or statistically. Even in 
this circumstance unequal outcomes may emerge, caused by wrong beliefs of being 
discriminated against tha t are self-confirming. Minority groups who expect being 
discriminated against exert a lower effort on average, because of a lower expected 
return. This induces a lower observed percentage of promotions within minority 
workers, which in turn is consistent with their beliefs that there are employers 
characterized by discriminatory tastes.
The experiment replicates the model using a  game where participants are ran­
domly divided into two populations: red and blue. In every trial each participant 
has an endowment of 10 Euro cents and can decide how many cents to bid to get 
a prize worth 25 Euro cents. Bets are not given back to the players, neither to the 
winner nor to the loser, making the game equivalent to an all-pay auction. There­
fore, at the end of the trial the winner gets 25 cents plus the amount not bet, while 
the loser only the amount not bet. In every lottery there are only two participants, 
one from the red population and one from the blue population. The players know 
that they face only one opponent in every trial and that it is possible to face the 
same opponent more than once during the same treatment, but of course they do 
not know when, given that random assignment takes place at the beginning of each 
trial. The prize is awarded to the higher bid and it is split if bids are equal, unless 
the opponents are assigned to a crazy computer which instead awards the prize to 
the red player regardless of the bids.
The mechanism underlying the SCE driven by wrong beliefs in the theoretical 
model is tested comparing the outcomes of an identical treatment proposed to the 
subjects both before and after they face an increasing fraction of crazy computers.
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A reduction of bids made by disadvantaged subjects is observed in three out of 
seven sessions, in line with the theoretical predictions, but it vanishes rather quickly 
during the treatment, failing to generate the SCE driven by wrong beliefs about 
discrimination. The parallel of this finding in the labor market would be a situation 
in which minority workers, after having been discriminated against, expect that 
unfavorable conditions continue while biased employers have actually disappeared. 
Hence, minority workers reduce their effort, and accordingly they are promoted less 
frequently, but eventually they discover that biased employers have disappeared 
and balanced promotions across populations of workers are observed.
The main reason that the experiment does not provide strong evidence in favor 
of unequal outcomes driven by subjects’ expectations, is that the experiment failed 
to separate the beliefs of the two populations. While in the theoretical model dif­
ferent expectations about the fraction of discriminatory employers are a necessary 
condition for unequal outcomes to emerge, in the lab Blues never expected a clearly 
higher fraction of crazy computers than did Reds. A possible explanation for this 
finding is that the experimental design laid too much emphasis on the discontinuity 
between treatments, preventing carryover effects from emerging.
Another possible reason that the experiment does not provide strong evidence 
in favor of unequal outcomes driven by subjects’ expectations, is the fact that the 
set of choices is roughly continuous. This continuity means that there is only a very 
slight difference in the optimal behavior of the advantaged and the disadvantaged 
subjects, and therefore also a very low cost of experimenting to discover the true 
state of nature. Finally, it is also worth noting that, from a regression where all 
observable and unobservable individual characteristics as well as the parameters 
of the experiment are controlled for, Blues display a propensity to bid much more 
than Reds ceteris paribv,$ in spite of the random assignment of the color.
The strategy method, on the other hand, supports the SCE driven by wrong 
beliefs. In fact, advantaged and disadvantaged subjects react in a different way
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when ad hoc aggregate statistics are displayed. A fictitious distribution shows a 
fraction of prizes won by the Blues decreasing from 80% to  0% in subsequent trials. 
Since all subjects are informed that there is no crazy computer, it might be ex­
pected that members of both populations ignore the aggregate statistics displayed 
and dissipate their endowment entirely. Red players, in fact, do not change their 
behavior significantly. Blue players, on the other hand, as the fictitious distribu­
tion of prizes becomes less and less favorable to  them, lower their offers. As a 
result, the fraction of blue players bidding more than the average of their oppo­
nents also decreases from 74.3% in the first trial, when the distribution of prizes 
was supposed to be more favorable, to  25.7% in the last trial without any change 
in fundamentals. What happens in the last trial is that blue players are influenced 
by the aggregate statistics showing that none of them got the prize, and thus bid 
less. In turn, their lower bids make them less likely to win, leading to unequal 
outcomes that axe consistent with wrong expectations th a t they were less likely to 
get the prize.
The experiment also deals with the relevance of the information structure by 
dividing the two populations in two subgroups. The first observes individual out­
comes only (bids and winners of the games in which the player is directly involved), 
while the second is also informed about the distribution of bids within, as well as 
the distribution of promotion across, populations. From the experiment there is 
no evidence of different patterns between these two subgroups.
Concluding, findings of the experiment provide some evidence supporting the 
SCE driven by wrong beliefs, but the evidence cannot be considered fully satis­
factory. In order to provide a more robust test of the theoretical model, future 
experiments should be modified to include such things as a dichotomized choice 
set or less clear-cut treatments. Another potentially fruitful way to test the model 
that is left for future research is to try a different version of the experiment in 
which Reds and Blues may behave differently even though they share similar be-
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liefs about the fraction of crazy computers. Implementing a  framework in which 
two Reds and two Blues compete for one prize could be a way to separate directly 
the behavior of Reds and Blues. In the version of the experiment presented in this 
chapter, similar beliefs lead to a similar behavior. If there are two players from 
each population, instead, even though all players share similar beliefs about the 
fraction of crazy computers, Reds should still bid a lot because, even though blue 
players are discriminated against, they need to compete against each other in order 
to get the prize, while for the Blues is pointless to try hard. Once behavior differs, 
a self-reinforcing mechanism could operate in which Blues bid less, they are not 
awarded the prize and they bid less and less, while Reds keep bidding significantly 
more.
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Appendix: instructions
T he E xperim ent - p a r t  A  (shown at the beginning)
The experiment will last approximately 60 minutes, but the actual length de­
pends on the speed of the slowest participant. The experiment is composed by two 
quizzes, eight stages and a questionnaire.
Numbers during the experiment represent Euro cents. Your final earnings will 
be the sum of all the Euro cents you earned throughout the experiment. Earnings 
depend on your choices as well as on the choices of your opponents during the 
game that will start in a few minutes.
The game consists of an auction, in which you have to bid in order to get a prize. 
The game will be repeated several times under potentially different conditions that 
will be explained at the beginning of each stage.
At the beginning of the experiment an algorithm will assign to every player 
a color label (red or blue) that wall be effective for the whole experiment. The 
two populations (Red and Blue) will be of equal size. In every repetition of the 
game your opponent will be an anonymous player randomly drawn from the other 
population (i.e. if you belongs to the red population you will always play against 
a Blue and vice versa).
In every repetition of the game you will be endowed with 10 Euro cents. You 
have to decide how much to  bid (from 0 to 10 cents) in order to win a prize worth 
25 Euro cents.
t
•  The higher bid wins the prize.
•  If bids are equal, the prize is equally split.
• Bids are not given back, neither to the winner nor to the loser.
Your earnings in every repetition of the game depends on two factors:
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1) The prize: 25 cents if you are awarded the prize, 12.5 cents if the prize is 
split, 0 if your opponent is awarded the prize;
2) How much of your endowment you did not bid.
N.B. You cannot save and transfer money from one repetition of the game to 
another. If you bid less than 10 cents the amount left will enter your earnings, but 
in the following repetition you will start again with 10 cents.
T he E xperim ent - p a r t  B (shown after Treatment 1)
Now a different kind of computers is introduced into the game. These comput­
ers, which are called “crazy computers,” award the prize always to the red player 
regardless of who bids more.
Notice that the computers we are talking about ( “normal” vs. “crazy”) are not 
the computers you have in front of you. The server computer has been programmed 
to receive the data from the client computers (i.e. to receive the bids that you enter 
in the PCs in front of you). In every repetition of the game, each pair of players is 
randomly associated with a partition of the server that can correspond to a normal 
computer (which assign the prize to the higher bid) or to a crazy computer (which 
always awards the prize to the Red).
NB: In every repetition of the game, the bids of each pair of players are ran­
domly assigned to a partition of the server computer. Hence, being assigned to a 
crazy or to a normal computer during one repetition of the game, does not depend 
on the kind of computer faced in the previous repetition and does not predict any­
thing about the kind of computer that will be faced in the following repetition. 
Prom this point of view it is like starting from the beginning at every repetition. 
You only have to bear in mind that each time there is a percentage of partitions 
of the server that represent crazy computers.
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How many are the crazy computers? The percentage of crazy computers can 
vary from 0% to 100% during the experiment, but it is held constant within each 
stage of the experiment. In some stages you will know the fraction of crazy com­
puters, in other stages that fraction will be unknown.
The introduction of crazy computers creates different conditions for Reds and 
Blues. To ensure that all participants have the same earnings opportunity, each 
Blue will receive a lump sum compensation of 3.5 Euro in addition to what earned 
during the experiment. This compensation corresponds to the estimated loss in­
duced by crazy computers and DOES NOT depend on the choices you will make 
during the experiment.
100
J J J J I
Bibliography
[1] Anderson, D.M. and M.J. Haupert (1999): “Employment and Statistical 
Discrimination: a Hands-On Experiment,” Journal of Economics, 25:1, 85-102.
[2] A nderson, L.R. and C.A. Holt (1997): “Information Cascades in the Lab­
oratory,” American Economic Review, 87:5, 847-862.
[3] A nderson, L.R., R.G. Fryer and C.A. Holt (2002): “Experimental Stud­
ies of Discrimination,” in Handbook on Economics of Discrimination, ed. by W. 
Rogers, forthcoming
[4] A nderson, S.P ., J.K. G o e r e e  a n d  C.A. H o l t  (1 9 9 8 ) :  “Rent Seeking with 
Bounded Rationality: An Analysis of the All Pay Auction,” Journal of Political 
Economy, 1 0 6 :4 , 82 8 -8 5 3
[5] Arrow , K.J. (1973): “The Theory of Discrimination,” in Discrimination in 
Labor Markets ed. by O. Ashenfelter and A. Rees. Princeton: Princeton Univer­
sity Press, 3-33.
[6] Banerjee, A.V. (1992): “A Simple Model of Herd Behavior,” Quarterly Jour­
nal of Economics, 107:3, 797-817.
[7] Baye, M.R., D. Kovenock and C.G. De V riers (1996): “The AU-Pay 
Auction with Complete Information,” Economic Theory, 8, 291-305.
101
[8] Bickchandani, S., D. Hirshleifer and I. W elch (1992): “A Theory 
of Fads, Fashion, Custom and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades,” 
Journal of Political Economy, 100:5, 992-1026.
[9] Bull, C., A. Schotter and K. W eigelt (1987): “Tournaments and Piece 
Rates: An Experimental Study,” Journal o f Political Economy, 95:1, 1-33.
[10] D a v is , D .D .  (1 9 8 7 ). “Maximal Quality Selection and Discrimination in  Em­
ployment,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 8, 9 7 -1 1 2 .
[11] Davis, D.D. and C.A. Holt (1993): Experimental Economics. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press.
[12] Davis, D.D. and R .J. Reilly (1994): “Do too Many Cooks Always Spoil 
the Stew? An Experimental Analysis of Rent-Seeking and the Role of a Strategic 
Buyer,” Public Choice, 95, 89-115.
[13] Duffy, J. and J. Ochs (2003): “Cooperative Behavior and the frequency 
of Social Interaction,” mimeo, University of Pittsburgh.
[14] Fershtman, C. AND U. Gneezy (2001): “Some Experimental Evidence 
on the Evolution of Discrimination, Cooperation and Perceptions of Fairness,” 
Economic Journal, 481, 679-703.
[15] Fischbacher, U. (2002): “zTree Experimenter’s Manual,” mimeo, Univer­
sity of Zurich.
[16] Fryer, R.G., J.K. G oeree and C.A. Holt (2002a): “Experience-Based 
Discrimination,” mimeo, The University of Virginia.
[17] -------------------- (2002b): “An Experimental Test of Statistical Discrimina­
tion” mimeo, The University of Virginia.
102
[18] HARGREAVES-HEAP, s. AND Y. Varoufakis (2002): “Some Experimental 
Evidence on the Evolution of Discrimination, Cooperation and Perceptions of 
Fairness,” Economic Journal, 481, 679-703.
[19] Hey, J. and A. Mo RONE (2002): “Do Markets Drive out Lemmings or 
Vice-Versa?,” mimeo.
[20] Lazear , E.P and S. Rosen (1981): “Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum 
Labor Contracts,” Journal of Political Economy, 89:5, 841-64.
[21] Lohm, S. (2000) “Stereotypes, Sex Discrimination and Paranoia - an experi­
mental study,” Scandinavian WP in Economics 2000:1.
[22] Marimon, R., S. Spear and S. Sunder (1993). “Expectationally-Driven 
Market Volatility: Experimental Evidence,” Journal of Economic Theory, 61, 
74-103.
[23] Murningham, J.K. (2001): “A Very Extreme Case of the Dollar Auction,” 
mimeo, Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University.
[24] O’Keeffe, M., W. K. Viscusi, and R. J. Zeckhauser (1984): “Economic 
Contests: Comparative Reward Schemes,” Journal of Labor Economics, 2:1, 27- 
56.
[25] P h e l p s , E .S .  (1 9 7 2 ): “The Statistical Theory of Racism a n d  Sexism,” Amer­
ican Economic Review, 6 2 :4 , 6 5 9 -6 6 1 .
[26] Roth, A.E. (1994). “Let’s Keep the Con out of Experimental Econ.: A 
Methodological Note,” Empirical Economics, 19, 99-109.
[27] SCHotter , A. AND K. WEIGELT (1992): “Asymmetric Tournaments, Equal 
Opportunity Laws, and Affirmative Action: Some Experimental Results,” Quar­
terly Journal of Economics, 107, 511-39.
[28] Selten, R. (1967): “Die Strategiemethode zur Erforschung des eingeschränkt 
rationalen Verhaltens im Rahmen eines Oligopolexperiments,” in Beiträge zur 
Experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung} ed. by H. Sauermann. Tübingen: J.C.B. 
Mohr, pp. 136-168.
[29] SHUBIK, M. (1971): “The Dollar Auction Game: A Paradox in Non-
Cooperative Behavior and Escalation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 15109-
111.
[30] W oodford , M. (1990). “Learning to Believe in Sunspots,” Econometrica, 
58:2, 277-308.
Chapter 4
Gender Wage Gap in 
Expectations and Realizations*
4.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on the correspondence between wage expectations and wage 
realizations from a gender perspective using data collected among students and 
graduates of Bocconi University in Milan, Italy. We show that the gender gap 
implied by students’ expectations one year after graduation is consistent with the 
gender gap implied by the earnings of their elder counterparts who have already 
graduated. There is instead a  misperception of the gender gap ten years after 
graduation because students expect the gender gap to be roughly constant while 
realizations point toward an increasing gap with experience. The gender gap di­
minishes but does not disappear when several controls such as family background, 
place of birth, high school diploma, university program attended, performance 
a t university, civil status and number of children are taken into account. More­
over, quite surprisingly, there is no evidence of a diminishing realized gender gap 
between subsequent cohorts of Bocconi graduates. On the contrary, the gender
^ h i s  chapter is part of a  jo in t project with Andrea Ichino.
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gap measured immediately after graduation shows a puzzling upward trend across 
cohorts.
When we distinguish between different levels of students’ performance, the best 
students appear to be characterized by a significant gender gap at the beginning of 
their careers, which is underestimated in expectations but which remains approxi­
mately constant with experience. For the worse students, instead, the gender gap 
is smaller and correctly anticipated at the beginning of a career, but it increases 
significantly with their working life and this growth is not expected. These differ­
ences between the best and the worse students suggest th a t the careers of females 
axe characterized by “glass ceilings” at high skill levels and by “sticky floors” at 
the opposite end of the skill spectrum.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the dataset. Section 
4.3.1 presents evidence on the reliability of our data while Section 4.4 shows the 
econometric evidence and discusses the main results of this chapter in connection 
with the existing literature. Section 4.5 analyzes whether the perception of the 
gender wage gap differs according to  students’ performance. Concluding remarks 
follow in Section 4.6.
4.2 The dataset
Students’ expectations were collected by circulating an anonymous questionnaire 
(reported at the end of the chapter) among second year Bocconi students. The 
questionnaire contains questions concerning wage expectations as well as personal 
information and family background. The data obtained were merged with Boc- 
coni’s administrative data about student’s curricula. We obtained access to the 
same type of administrative information also for a sample of Bocconi graduates, 
who were interviewed about their current and past working situation. In this way a 
clean matching between similar Bocconi students and Bocconi graduates was made
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possible. Through this matching, we are now able to analyze the expectations of 
students comparing them with the realizations observed for similar graduates.
4 .2 .1  Stu d en ts: expected  w orking situ ation
The questionnaire concerning students’ expectations was circulated by Bocconi 
staff attached to the yearly course evaluation forms. In this way most of the 2497 
second year students received the questionnaire.2 We got back complete reliable 
answers for 1154 questionnaires. Since the questionnaires were anonymous we 
had to use personal information like gender, date and province of birth to merge 
them with administrative data. Matching was successful for 887 observations. The 
remaining observations could not be merged either because of the incompleteness 
of the personal information (e.g. wage expectations, gender and/or date and/or 
province of birth missing) or because it was not possible to identify a unique 
counterpart of the questionnaire in the administrative data.
Despite this loss of observations, it is reassuring that descriptive statistics of the 
merged questionnaires do not significantly differ from those of the questionnaires 
which could not be merged. The only relevant difference that emerges is that 
among non-matched questionnaires there are fewer females (42.8% vs. 49.7%). 
Given that one of the purposes of this project is to check whether there are gender 
differentials in the expected working situation this might be a problem at first sight. 
However, breaking down matched and non-matched questionnaires across gender, 
the descriptive statistics of matched and non-matched males are similar. The same 
is true for the statistics of matched and non-matched females.3 This evidence 
supports the fact that the missing information is missing almost randomly.
The questionnaire consists of three parts. The first part concerns the student’s 
expected wage, occupation and sector of employment both one and ten years after
2 Bocconi estimates that 75% of the students were attending the courses.
3 These statistics are omitted to save space, but are available from the authors.
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graduation. The second part focuses directly on the gender wage gap, asking 
students about the percentage gender wage differential they expect. In more detail, 
students axe asked to use their expected wage (set equal to one hundred) as a 
benchmark and to report what is the wage tha t they think would be earned by a 
student with the same characteristics as theirs but of the other gender. In what 
follows, we will refer to this variable as the “self-reported” gender gap, to stress 
the difference with respect to the gender gap implied by the comparison between 
the average expected wages of males and females in the sample, collected in the 
first part of the questionnaire.
Moreover, students who give a “self-reported” gender gap different from zero are 
asked to choose among some possible explanations for such gap. The proposed ex­
planations are closely linked with different theories in the discrimination literature 
(e.g. discriminatory tastes, statistical discrimination, human capital approach).
Finally, the role of the last section, which collects information about personal 
data and family background, is twofold. On the one hand, it makes it possible 
to merge the questionnaires with the administrative data. On the other hand, it 
provides a way of checking the reliability of the responses to the other parts of the 
questionnaire, because some answers, like those concerning school performance, 
can be verified using the administrative data.
4 .2 .2  S tu d en ts an d  graduates: adm in istrative data
As already mentioned, information taken from the questionnaires circulated among 
students was merged with Bocconi’s administrative records. In addition to infor­
mation about date of birth, place of birth, place of residence, etc. Bocconi’s files 
keep track of students’ high school background (name and place of the high school, 
type of diploma, grade obtained) and of all the details about students’ university 
career (degree program; specialization; code, date and grade of all the passed ex­
ams). For the graduates, information about graduation (date, grade, etc.) is also
1 0 8
4 .2 .3  G rad u ates: w orking situation
A sample of Bocconi graduates was also interviewed, collecting information about 
their current and past working situation. This dataset contains a great deal of 
information, to be used also in other research projects. Here we use only the 
variables which are available also for students. It is important to keep in mind 
that the questionnaire circulated among Bocconi students has been designed to be 
compatible with the information available for graduates. Therefore, the questions 
have been designed to be as similar as possible to those asked in the survey of 
graduates. This latter was conducted by the Research Institute CIRM on behalf 
of Bocconi University. The target sample included all the 5091 graduates in four 
years: 1985, 1989, 1993 and 1997. CIRM selected a sample of 2802 students. 
However, 697 observations have been disregarded because they contain missing 
values for crucial variables like wages, leading to a final sample of 2105 observations.
4.3 Reliability of the data
4 .3 .1  In tern al consistency o f the expectations dataset
The dataset on student’s expectations offers two ways of estimating the gender 
gap: first, using the average expected wages computed for the students of the 
two genders and, second, using the “self-reported” wage gap asked directly by the 
questionnaire. The comparison between these two different measures of the same 
concept allow us to check the internal consistency of the expectations dataset.
From descriptive statistics, which for reasons of space are not reported here, 
it emerges that the difference between the expected wage of males and females is 
greater than the “self-reported” gender gap. There are two possible explanations:
available.
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Table 4.1: Classes of income in the questionnaires
from 1032.91 
from 2065.83 
from 3098.74 
from 4131.66 
from 5164.57
up to 1032.91 
up to 2065.83 
up to 3098.74 
up to 4131.66 
up to 5164.57
N ote: M o n th ly  incom e n e t o f  ta x e s  a n d  c o n tr ib u tio n s  a t  2001 p rices  (E u ro ) .
either there is a misperception of the expected gender gap or the discrepancy is due 
to the fact that while the “self-reported” gender gap refers to identical students of 
different genders, in the sample males and females have different characteristics. 
However, if we include in a regression where the expected wage is the dependent 
variable the “self-reported” gender gap among the observable characteristics that 
are controlled for, the dummy for gender is no longer statistically significant. Simi­
larly, this dummy is not significant in a regression with the same controls but where 
the sample has been restricted to students who show a “self-reported” gender gap 
equal to zero. We interpret these results as evidence in favor of the internal con­
sistency of the dataset. In fact, controlling for several characteristics, differences 
between the expected wages across genders are not significantly different from the 
“self-reported” gender gap.4
4 .3 .2  Interval m easures for w ages
Both students and graduates were asked to report their expected and actual wage 
choosing between income classes according to the scheme described in Table 4.1.5 
Regressions in this chapter are based on income measures obtained by assigning
4 Results of this analysis are not reported to save space, but are available from the authors.
5 The reason Table 4.1 involves Euro cents is that in the questionnaires amonunts were denom­
inated in Lira, given that the questionnaires were circulated before the Euro became the official 
currency.
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a point estimate to every class. To be precise we used the following rule. 75 percent 
of the upper bound was imputed for the lowest class; the mid point was imputed 
for each intermediate class and 125 percent of the lower bound was imputed for 
the highest class. This rule, like any other, is certainly arbitrary but it follows 
from the plausible assumption that the income distribution is uniform within each 
intermediate class, while being skewed toward the upper (lower) bound in the 
lowest (highest) class.
Robustness checks have been performed on this rule, with particular attention 
to the implications for gender differentials. Whenever possible, “Interval regres­
sions” have been compared to OLS regressions based on income data constructed 
with this rule, obtaining very similar results. Note, however, that it was possible 
to compare these two type of results only when current wages were used.6 Yet, 
the similarity of OLS and Interval regression results when both were feasible is 
reassuring.
4.4 Results
Table 4.2 shows the gender wage gap derived from:
1. students’ wage expectations at one and ten years after graduation (respec­
tively <o and ti);
2. wages earned by the four cohorts of Bocconi graduates. For these cohorts to 
stands for the first wage earned, while t\ stands for the current (2001) wage. 
Note, therefore, that for graduates the number of years between to and ti is
6 In fact, the wage at the time of graduation needs to be corrected for the CPI because in the 
sample of graduates individuals started working in different years even within the same cohort. 
This causes the intervals to be different (and overlapping) across individuals. Furthermore, 
when wage growth is used interval regressions are either useless or not feasible regardless of the 
correction for the CPI.
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Table 4.2: Percentage gender wage gap - uncontrolled
Cohort: 
N. obs:
Students
887
grad85
234
grad89
469
grad93
637
grad97
765
*0 -0.097***
(0.027)
-0.024
(0.053)
-0.030
(0.032)
-0.063**
(0.029)
-0.096***
(0.026)
h -0.139***
(0.026)
-0.569***
(0.068)
-0.423***
(0.048)
-0.263***
(0.037)
-0.158***
(0.030)
N ote: s ta n d a rd  e rro rs  in  p a re n th e s e s  w i th  p < 0 .1  =  * , p < 0 .0 5  =  **, p < 0 .0 1  =  ***.
T h e  co lum n  la b e ls  “g rad * * ” in d ic a te  t h e  19** c o h o r t o f  g ra d u a te s .  
to =  s tu d e n ts ’ e x p e c te d  w ag e  1 y e a r  a f te r  g ra d u a tio n ; 1st w a g e  e a rn e d  b y  g ra d u a te s  
¿1=  s tu d e n ts ’ e x p e c te d  w ag e  10 y e a rs  a f te r  g ra d u a tio n ; g r a d u a te s ’ c u r re n t w age 
P e rcen tag e  g a p  c o m p u te d  o n  re a l w ag es  (p rices  in  2001).
not necessarily equal to  nine. All the wages axe real, having the wages in to 
been corrected for the variation of the CPI.
Results in Table 4.2 are obtained, without controls, from the following basic 
regression
W k =  ak +  ¡3kF  +  ek, (4.1)
where W is the logaritm of expected or actual wages at r  =  to or r  = fl5 F is a 
dummy taking value one for females, e is a disturbance term and k is the cohort. 
For each expected or actual wage measure the coefficient reported in the table is /3, 
which approximates the percentage gender wage gap: for example -0.097 in the top 
left part of the table means that wage expectations of females are 9.7 percent lower 
than wage expectations of males. Note in this table, and in the similar following 
one, that figures in the tQ row are comparable, being measures of the gender gap at 
the beginning of a career. Figures in the t\ row are less easily comparable because 
they are measures of the gender gap at different levels of experience (10 years for 
students’ expectations, 16 years for the 1985 cohort, etc.). However, comparisons 
within columns are possible as long as it is kept in mind that they give measures
112
Table 4.3: Percentage gender wage gap - controlled
Cohort: 
N. obs:
Students
887
grad85
234
grad89
469
grad93
637
grad97
765
*0 -0.082***
(0.027)
-0.009
(0.121)
-0.020
(0.064)
-0.064
(0.044)
-0.125***
(0.029)
ii -0.106***
(0.026)
-0.308**
(0.155)
-0.150*
(0.092)
-0.185***
(0.056)
-0.162***
(0.033)
N ote: s ta n d a rd  e rro rs  in  p a ren th ese s  w ith  p < 0 .1  =  *, p < 0 .0 5  =  **, p < 0 .0 1  =  ***. 
C on tro ls : h ig h  school d ip lo m a , fam ily  b a c k g ro u n d , househo ld  b u sin ess , degree  p rog ram , 
p lace  o f b ir th ,  p e rfo rm a n c e  a t  un iversity , c iv il s ta tu s  a n d  n u m b e r o f ch ild ren . F or grad­
u a te s , also  p a r t- t im e  w o rk  is u sed  as c o n tro l.
T h e  co lum n labels “g ra d * * ” in d ic a te  th e  19** co h o rt o f  g rad u a te s . 
tQ— s tu d e n ts ’ e x p e c te d  w age 1 y e a r a f te r  g ra d u a tio n ; 1st w age e a rn e d  by g ra d u a te s  
t i =  s tu d e n ts ’ e x p ec ted  w age 10 y ea rs  a f te r  g ra d u a tio n ; g ra d u a te s ’ c u rre n t w age 
P e rcen tag e  g a p  c o m p u te d  on  re a l w ages (p rices  in  2001).
of how the gender gap evolves during the working life in different cohorts and for 
different intervals of experience.
Four facts are immediately evident in Table 4.2. First, the gender gap ex­
pected by students one year after graduation is very similar to the gender gap 
experimented by the youngest cohort of graduates (1997). Second, the expected 
gender gap ten years after graduation seems to heavily underestimate the actual 
gender wage gap. The gap that students expect ten years after graduation is even 
lower than the gap that those who graduated in 1997 experience only four years 
after graduation. Third, the actual gender gap immediately after graduation shows 
a rather intriguing upward trend across subsequent cohorts: this gap is three times 
larger for the 1997 cohort than for the 1985 cohort. Fourth, both the actual and 
the expected gender gap increase with labor market experience, but the former 
seems to increase more.
How does the picture change when controls are included? Table 4.3 displays the 
percentage gender wage gap when several characteristics, like family background, 
place of birth, high school diploma, university program attended, performance at
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university, civil status and number of children are added to equation 4.1. The 
magnitude of the gender gap decreases in most of the cases when controls are 
included. This is not surprising given the important role played in particular by the 
civil status and the number of children in explaining the different achievement of 
males and females in the labor market. However, there is a remarkable exception: 
the youngest cohort. Although it is intuitive that the younger the cohort the 
smaller the importance of civil status and number of children as controls, it is 
striking that for those who graduated in 1997 the gender wage gap is even higher 
when controls are included. Moreover, the upward trend across cohorts in the 
gender gap immediately after graduation is still present when controls are included, 
which is a result worth particular attention.
As far as expectations are concerned, the expected gender gap one year after 
graduation is roughly correct even when individual characteristics are controlled 
for. Similarly, the inclusion of controls does not alter the finding that students 
heavily underestimate the expected gender gap ten years after graduation. Even 
when controls are included the gap that students expect ten years after graduation 
is lower than the gap that those who graduated in 1997 experience only four years 
after graduation.
As we said, the figures in the t\  row are not directly comparable across columns 
because the time from first job is different for every cohort. Table 4.4 eliminates the 
problem by using the annual growth of expected and actual wages as a dependent 
variable. More specifically, the basic estimated equation is
^ L = S k + 'ykF  + T]k, (4.2)
*1 — to
where, for every cohort fc, AW k is the difference of the logarithm of expected or 
actual wages between t\ and to and ii — to is measured in years without rounding. 
For each expected or actual wage measure, the coefficient reported in the table 
is 7, which approximates the gender gap in the yearly growth of wages. The
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Table 4.4: Annual growth of the gender wage gap
Cohort: 
N. obs:
Students
887
grad85
234
grad89
469
grad93
637
grad97
765
uncontrolled -0.017* -0.081*** -0.079*** -0.064*** -0.049***
(0.010) (0.020) (0.014) (0.013) (0.017)
controlled -0.011 -0.054 -0.033 -0.038* -0.036*
(0.010) (0.041) (0.027) (0.021) (0.020)
N o te : s ta n d a r d  e rro rs  in  p a re n th e se s  w ith  p < 0 .1  =  *, p < 0 .0 5  =  **, p < 0 .0 1  =  *** 
C o n tro ls : fam ily  b a c k g ro u n d , p lace  o f b ir th ,  h igh  school d ip lo m a , u n iv e rs ity  p rog ram  
a t te n d e d , p e rfo rm a n c e  a t  u n iversity , civil s ta tu s  an d  n u m b e r o f  ch ild ren . F o r g rad u a tes , 
a lso  p a r t - t im e  w ork  is u sed  as co n tro l.
T h e  co lum n  lab e ls  “g ra d * * ” in d ic a te  th e  19** cohort o f g ra d u a te s .
first row of the table reports the uncontrolled estimates, while the second row 
reports results obtained by controlling for observable characteristics like family 
background, place of birth, high school diploma, university program attended, 
performance at university, civil status and number of children. For example -0.036 
in the bottom right part of the table means that within the cohort of those who 
graduated in 1997 wages of females grew 3.6% less than wages of males for every 
year once controls are included. Table 4.4 confirms that students do not guess 
correctly the growth over time of the gender gap. In fact, they do not expect the 
gender gap to increase significantly, while this is an undisputable fact observable 
in the wage realizations of graduates.
Summarizing the findings of this section, a first important result is that in 
our data there is no evidence of a decreasing gender gap over time, i.e. across 
subsequent cohorts of Bocconi graduates, at the beginning of a career. On the 
contrary, our evidence points toward an increase of the gender gap in recent years, 
and in particular for the 1993 and 1997 cohorts.
This result is striking because several recent studies indicate that the gender 
wage gap has been narrowing since the ’70s in most industrialized countries (see,
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for example, Blau and Kahn, 1996 and 1997). Specifically for the US, Datta Gupta, 
Oaxaca and Smith (2001) show a clear decline of the gender wage gap during the 
1980s. As far as the United Kingdom is concerned, Blundell, Gosling, Ichimura 
and Meghir (2002) show that gender wage differentials for younger highly edu­
cated workers fell between 1978 and 1998. Similarly, Fitzenberger and Wunderlich 
(2002) find that the gender wage gap for full-time employed workers decreased 
considerably during the period 1975-95, particularly in the lower part of the wage 
distribution. Also in Italy the gender gap has been estimated to be narrowing 
by Flabbi (1997), who reports that gender differentials decreased from about 30% 
in 1977 to less than 20% in 1995. Only Scandinavian countries do not display a 
similar pattern, as reported by D atta Gupta, Oaxaca and Smith (2001), but in 
these countries the gender wage gap was already very small and is still among the 
lowest in the world.
Moreover, evidence of a narrowing gender gap between subsequent cohorts is 
somehow in line with the predictions of the most representative theoretical contri­
butions within the discrimination literature. For example, both the discriminatory 
taste approach (Becker, 1957) and the statistical discrimination model (Arrow, 
1973) imply that gender differentials should not survive in the long-run. A gender 
wage gap could persist in the long-run in the presence of self-confirming expecta­
tions, as suggested by Chapter 2. But even in this case there would be no reason 
to expect an increasing gap. Hence, it is rather puzzling to find such a pattern in 
the data analyzed in this chapter.
We can think of only one plausible reason explaining the difference of our results 
with respect to the literature. The increasing gender wage gap displayed in our data 
could be a consequence of the fading effects of the cost of living adjustment called 
Scala Mobile which prevailed in Italy during the ’80s and which was abolished in 
1992. As explained, for example, in Erickson and Ichino (1994), the design of this 
adjustment scheme implied a strong compressionary effect on wage differentials of
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all kinds and in particular on the gender wage gap. The abolition of the Scala 
Mobile is likely to have allowed an expansion of wage differentials which had been 
previously artificially compressed.
A second important result of this section is that the gender wage gap increases 
in the first part of the working life. In the literature, a few longitudinal studies 
provide evidence about the time profile of the gender gap within cohorts. Loprest 
(1992) finds an 11 percent gender wage gap at hiring within a sample of US young 
workers of all education levels during the period 1978-83. This gap increases in the 
first years after hiring and then decreases later during the working life. Light and 
Ureta (1995) present similar evidence. Kunze (2002) studies the evolution of the 
gender wage gap within the early stages of careers in Germany. She finds a gender 
gap of approximately 25 percent for the entry wages of skilled workers trained in 
vocational schools, but in contrast with the above studies, this gap remains roughly 
constant during the first eight years after hiring.
A third important result is that students’ expectations appear to internalize 
correctly the existence of a gender gap at the beginning of the career, but not 
that such a gap increases during the working life. We are aware of only one 
paper to which this result can be compared, i.e. the paper by Brunello, Lucifora 
and Winter-Ebmer (2001), who collected a dataset containing information about 
wage expectations of more than 6000 European college students, although they 
do not have information on wage realizations and they are not interested in a 
gender perspective. The authors kindly gave us access to summary statistics of 
their data from which we could analyze wage expectations by gender. Focusing 
on the countries where at least 500 observations are available, the data suggest 
the existence of large differences in expectations across countries. The expected 
gender gap one year after graduation ranges from 9.2% in Switzerland to 18.7% in 
Germany, with Italy and Portugal situated in the middle with a gap of 12.6% and 
16% respectively. As far as Italy is concerned, their figure differs from ours (9.7%
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in Table 4.2), but it should be noticed that their sample of Italian students does 
not include Bocconi University. The cross country differences axe less evident when 
looking at the expected gender gap ten years after graduation. In this case the gap 
is very similar in Germany and Switzerland (23.3% and 23.8%, respectively) while 
it is slightly higher in Portugal (26.5%) and Italy (28.3%). The corresponding figure 
in our dataset is 13.9%, which indicates that Bocconi students have expectations 
about the shape of the gender gap during the working life that significantly differ 
from the expectations of other Italian students.
4.5 Wage expectations and realizations at differ­
ent levels of educational performance
In order to deepen our analysis of the relationship between wage expectations and 
wage realizations, in this section we stratify the sample of students and graduates 
according to their educational performance. Two slightly different stratification 
procedures have been used for graduates and students.
Using administrative data on the entire population of Bocconi graduates (i.e. not 
just the graduates interviewed by CIRM) the average grade that separates the top 
25% and the bottom 25% of the population is used to define the best and the 
worst performing students. This is done separately for each cohort, since grades 
are likely to  be comparable only within cohorts (see Table 4.5).
As fax as students are concerned, again using population data from adminis­
trative records, the top and bottom 25% thresholds axe identified according to a 
performance variable tha t summarizes the number of exams passed during the first 
year, weighted according to their difficulty and the grade obtained (see Table 4.6),
Table 4.7 shows the frequencies of top and bottom performers in our samples of 
graduates and students, using the thresholds defined above for the respective pop-
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Table 4.5: Grades defining top and bottom 25% performance in thè population of 
graduates
cohort bottom 25% top 25%
1985 < 24.37 > 27.15
1989 < 24.45 > 27.12
1993 <  25.20 > 27.82
1997 <  25.72 > 27.89
Note: the support of the grade variable is [18,30]
Table 4.6: Normalised indicator defining top and bottom 25% performance in the 
population of students
Students bottom 25% top 25%
2nd year < 38.93 > 60.36
Note: the support of the performance variable is [0,100]
ulations. If the samples corresponded exactly to the populations these frequencies 
should always be equal to 25%, but this is clearly not the case. In particular, they 
are slightly smaller for the top group of graduates and this might be due to the fact 
that top graduates are more likely to earn higher wages and, for this reason, to be 
under-represented in the sample since they refused to answer the income question 
in the CIRM questionnaire. As far as students are concerned the frequency in the 
top group is almost 10 points higher than 25%, which may be due to the fact that 
students not attending classes are more likely to be worse performers and did not 
receive the questionnaire.7
On the basis of the stratification described above we have replicated the anal­
ysis of the previous section separately for top, intermediate and bottom students, 
in order to see whether the comparison between wage expectations and wage re-
7 Rem em ber th a t th e  students’ questionnaires were attached  to  th e  evaluation forms of some 
courses. Therefore, ou r students sam ple has been drawn from the population of students still 
a ttending courses a t  th e  end of th e  term .
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Table 4.7: Distribution of “top” and “bottom” in the sample
Group % of “top" % of “bottom"
Cohort 85 17.95 27.35
Cohort 89 21.11 24.31
Cohort 93 21.19 25.75
Cohort 97 23.01 24.71
2nd yr stud 34.22 12.86
Table 4.8: Expected and realized gender gap one year after graduation, by educa­
tional performance and controlling for observable characteristics
top top medium medium bottom bottom
Stud. Grad. Stud. Grad. Stud. Grad.
N. obs: 288 452 466 1122 133 531
Female -0.Ö38 -0.165*** -0.087** -0.119*** -0.134* -0.138***
(0.048) (0.053) (0.037) (0.029) (0.076) (0.050)
N ote: s ta n d a rd  e rro rs  in  p a re n th e se s  w i th  p < 0 .1 = * , p < 0 .0 5 = * * , p < 0 .0 1 = * * * . 
D e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le : log of re a l w age.
C o n tro ls : fam ily  b ack g ro u n d , p la c e  o f  b i r th ,  h ig h  sch o o l d ip lo m a , u n iv e rs ity  p ro g ram  
a tte n d e d , civil s t a tu s  a n d  n u m b e r  o f  c h ild re n . F o r g ra d u a te s ,  a lso  t im e  s in ce  g rad u a tio n  
an d  p a r t - t im e  w o rk  a re  u sed  a s  co n tro l.
alizations differs according to educational performance. The analysis is performed 
pooling together the four cohorts of graduates because the sample size was not 
large enough to  allow for the distinction between performance levels within each 
cohort separately. However, we include years since graduation into the regressions 
to control for experience.
Results obtained controlling for observable characteristics are presented in Ta­
ble 4.8 for the gender gap measured immediately after graduation and in Table 4.9 
for the yearly growth of this gap.
The first interesting fact emerging from these tables is that top students clearly 
underestimate the gender gap at the beginning of a career (to)» while the guess 
of intermediate and bottom students is more accurate. This result hints at the
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Table 4.9: Expected and realized gender gap growth, by educational performance 
and controlling for observable characteristics
top top medium medium bottom bottom
Stud. Grad. Stud. Grad. Stud. Grad.
N. obs: 288 452 466 1122 133 531
Female -0.008 -0.008 -0.002 -0.016* 0.005 -0.041***
(0.005) (0.016) (0.004) (0.009) (0.008) (0.015)
N ote: s ta n d a rd  e r ro rs  in  p a re n th e se s  w ith  p < 0 .1 = * , p < 0 .0 5 = * * , p < 0 .0 1 = * * * . 
D ep en d en t v a riab le : rea l w age g ro w th .
C ontro ls: fam ily  b ack g ro u n d , p lace  o f b ir th , high schoo l d ip lo m a , u n iv e rs ity  p rog ram  
a tte n d e d , c iv il s t a tu s  a n d  n u m b e r  o f ch ild ren . For g ra d u a te s , a lso  tim e  since g rad u a tio n  
a n d  p a r t- t im e  w o rk  a re  used  a s  co n tro l.
possibility that top performing students may start their working career under the 
assumption that the human capital acquired in school is going to be the main 
determinant of success in the labor market, whereas the reality is different.
A second striking set of facts is offered by the comparison between graduates 
in the two tables. In the top performance group we see the largest gender gap at 
the beginning of the career (see Table 4.8). However, the growth of the gender 
gap during the working life is larger in the intermediate and bottom performance 
group (see Table 4.9).
These results suggest the possibility of different patterns of job assignment be­
tween males and females at different stages of a career and at different levels of 
the occupational hierarchy. For example, in the case of the top graduates, wage 
differences, possibly due to different job assignments, seem to emerge immediately 
after graduation and to persist more or less constantly during the career. A dif­
ferent pattern characterizes the bottom graduates. Here the evidence suggests 
that not only do wages differ already at the beginning of the career, but also that 
the difference increases during the working life. As a result, the gender wage gap 
increases with experience. Following Booth, Francesconi and Frank (1998), this 
evidence is consistent with the existence of “glass ceilings” for highly skilled fe-
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male graduates, who are excluded from the very beginning of their careers from 
the same wage prospects offered to males of similar ability. At the same time, our 
evidence suggests that at the opposite end of the skill spectrum unskilled females 
experience “sticky floors” which prevent them from enjoying during their careers 
the same wage growth as their male counterparts.
4.6 Conclusions
The evidence presented in this chapter points towards some interesting findings. 
We show that the gender gap implied by students1 expectations one year after 
graduation is consistent with the gender gap observed in the actual earnings of their 
older counterparts who have already graduated. There is instead a misperception 
of the gender gap ten years after graduation because students expect the gender 
gap to be roughly constant while realizations point toward an increasing gap with 
tenure. The gender gap diminishes but does not disappear when several controls 
such as family background, place of birth, high school diploma, university program 
attended, performance at university, civil status and number of children are taken 
into account.
A second set of intriguing results concerns the evidence on realized gender gaps 
independently of expectations. Here, in contrast with the recent literature for 
industrialized countries, we see no evidence of a diminishing gender gap between 
subsequent cohorts of Bocconi graduates at the beginning of a career. In particular, 
the gender gap immediately after graduation displays a puzzling upward trend and 
reaches particularly high and significant values in the most recent 1997 cohort. 
This result is likely to be a consequence of the elimination of the cost of living 
adjustment scheme called Scala Mobile which prevailed in Italy during the ’80s 
and was abolished in 1992.
Finally, while the gender wage gap for the best graduates is large at the be­
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ginning of a career but remains more or less constant throughout the working life, 
for the worst graduates the gender gap starts slightly lower but increases more 
significantly with experience. These results suggest that the careers of females are 
characterized by “glass ceilings,” in particular at high skill levels, and by “sticky 
floors” at the opposite end of the skill spectrum. Unfortunately, our data do not 
allow us to shed more light on the real nature and on the determinants of these 
differences in career developments.
The existence of gender differences of this kind, even in a very homogeneous 
group of highly skilled workers like that of by Bocconi graduates, is striking and 
clearly calls for more research and better data.
!
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Occupation and income expectations of Bocconi students
Dear Student, we kindly ask you to fill this questionnaire concerning entrance in the labor market Please consider that data are collected for the sole purpose of scientific research and that results will be circulated referring to aggregate statistics only.
1. After graduation do you expect to  w ork in a household business? Dy e s  Gno
Your occupation will m ore likely be:
Paid Employment
White collar.................................................
1 year after graduation 
(one choice)
........................... □ ...........................
10 years after graduatioi 
(one choice)
......................... □
Middle manager........................................... ....................... D......................... ................ □
General manager....................................... ....................... D......................... ......................... D
Secondary school teacher............................. ......................  □ ................... . ......................... □
University teacher........................................ ...............  0 ................. ................. □
Other paid employment (GIVE DETAILS)......
Self Employment
Business consultant..................................... ................... □ ................. ................  □
Professional (non business consultant).......... ...................□ .................. ................  □
Enterpreneur............................................... ...................□ ................. ................  □
Other self employment (GIVE DETAILS).......
3. In which sector? (one choice)
□manufacturing Dfmance Dpublic □ trade □other (GIVE DETAILS).
4. How much do you think your monthly labour income net o f taxes and contributions w ill be (at
1 year after graduationconstant prices)
Less than L. 2.000.000......
L.2.001.000 -1.3.000.000.. 
L.3.001.000 - L.4.000.000.. 
L.4.001.000 - L.5.000.000.. 
L.5.001.000 - L.6.000.000.. 
L.6.001.000 - L.8.000.000.. 
L.8.001.000-L.10.000.000 
More than L 10.000.000....
10 years after graduation
5. Setting to 100 your wage 1 year after graduation, how much do you think would be earned by a 
student with the same characteristics as yours but of the  other gender?
3____ o____ □ □____ n_____□ □ □ □ □ □
50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150
6. Setting to 100 your wage 10 year after graduation, how much do you think would be earned by a 
student with the same characteristics as yours but of the other gender?
□___ □ □ □ o_____ □ □ □ □ □ _ □
50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150
7. If your answer in 5 and/or 6 was different from  100: why? (multiple choices allowed)
□ Characteristics and aptitudes actually differ between males and females 
D Different distribution of household duties
□ Employers expect differenct characteristics between males and females
□ Employers’ tastes given equal characteristics and hosehold duties
8. Year
9. Degree Program
10. Province of birth
11. Gender
12. Date of birth
13. Nr. of passed exams
14. Average grade
15. Education of the father
16. Education o f the m other
17. Father’s occupation
18. Mother's occupation
19. Tuition category □ 1A
□ 2A Q 3A 04* □ F.C.
□CLE DCLEA GCLAPI DCLELI DCLG DCLEFIN DCLEACC
□ Male □ Female
□PRIMARY ^SECONDARY 0  COLLEGE GUNIVERSITY
□PRIMARY OSECONDARY □ COLLEGE DUNIVERSITY
□  2A D3A □  4A D5A D6a
j
Thanks for your cooperation
f f W f i ................
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